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ABSTRACT 
 
 
     This paper probes the history of the Temple Mount complex during the British Mandate for 
Palestine.  Approaching this sacred space from three different perspectives—British, Arab, and 
Jewish—this paper examines how people and events surrounding it contributed to the evolution 
of Palestine after World War I.  Ultimately, I argue that Britain’s non-policy on the Temple 
Mount undermined the Mandate project and ultimately contributed to the rise of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  Fearful of angering Muslims in Palestine and around the world, the British 
handed control of the space to an indigenous Arab-Muslim administration.  This policy of 
“affirmative deference” allowed certain Muslim leaders to carve out a sphere of de facto 
sovereignty inside the site and establish a base for resistance to the British government.  For 
many Jewish settlers in Palestine, sanctioned and unchecked Arab power inside Judaism’s holiest 
site led them to abandon faith in the Mandate and formulate their own plans for independence.  
Stated simply, Britain’s mismanagement of the Temple Mount intensified the fragmentation of 
Palestine from its geographical and ideological center.  In addition to telling an important micro-
history of the period, I also hope to provide a useful case study for broader analysis of the 
interaction between secular and traditional authority and the dynamics of sacred space.   
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MANAGING THE DIVINE JURISDICTION: SACRED SPACE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW ON THE 
TEMPLE MOUNT (1917-1948) 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     The Temple Mount complex, known as the Haram ash-Sharif in Arabic, is a sacred space 
inside Jerusalem that holds profound significance for the Abrahamic faiths.
1
  In all three 
traditions it is a place of supernatural power and the gateway to another world.
2
  Great Britain 
captured this holy site from the Ottoman Empire in World War I and received an international 
mandate to manage it and the rest of Palestine on behalf of its inhabitants.  Britain’s goal in this 
overwhelmingly Arab land was to create both a self-governing state and a national home for the 
Jewish people.  The inherent contradictions underlying this regime led to its ultimate collapse in 
1948, when the British fled the country “amid bloodshed, chaos, recrimination and ignominy.”
3
 
Chaos and bloodshed still persist in the present day and powerfully influence international 
affairs.  In the early twenty-first century, the Temple Mount stands at the center of this tumult as 
a perennial wellspring of radicalism and violence.  Noting the situation in the present, this paper 
returns to the early years of the Jewish-Arab conflict to understand the significance of the 
Temple Mount at the conflict’s very beginning. 
     Although they will be cautious to quantify it, most scholars will acknowledge the Temple 
Mount as a significant variable in the conflict today.  It is well-known to be significant to Jews 
                                                          
1
 In this paper I will use the phrase “Temple Mount complex” to describe the Temple Mount platform and its 
Western Wall.  I would argue this phrase is better than other recently-invented phrases such as “the Holy Basin” and 
“the Sacred Esplanade” because it specifically denotes the ancient Jewish temple and its historical footprint as the 
central cog around which the rest turns. 
2
 See generally Oleg Grabar & Benjamin Z. Kedar (eds.), Where Heaven and Earth Meet: Jerusalem’s Sacred 
Esplanade (Jerusalem: Yed Ben-Zvi, 2009); John M. Lundquist, The Temple of Jerusalem: Past, Present, and 
Future (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008). 
3
 Bernard Wasserstein, Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), 82. 
2 
 
 
 
and Muslims who live in the region as well as in other parts of the world.
4
   Both sides regularly 
call for exclusive possession of the site.
5
  At the Camp David talks in 2000, Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders refused to concede sovereignty over it.
6
  Their deadlock sealed the fate of the 
Oslo Accords and helped pave the way for the Second Intifada.
7
  Protests, riots, and police 
actions have been regular occurrences at the site ever since.  Today, the Temple Mount continues 
to frustrate attempts at political compromise.
8
  
     But how significant was the Temple Mount during the British Mandate?  Scholars often 
minimize religious themes during the Mandate period and focus instead on issues of 
immigration, land, or labor.
9
   If named at all, the Temple Mount is mentioned only as one minor 
point of contention among many.  This silence is unfortunate.  Primary sources reveal that the 
Temple Mount, like other religious issues, was in fact very relevant to the history of the period.  
The site’s significance lay not so much in stimulating radicalism as it does today, but in spatially 
and conceptually linking Palestine’s three competing regimes.  All three of these regimes—
                                                          
4
 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern National Consciousness (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), 18.  In his book Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity (New York: 
Macmillan, 2008), Yitzhak Reiter makes a compelling argument that Jerusalem and its Temple Mount did not attain 
its present level of significance until after 1967.  However, Reiter neglects a substantial examination of the Mandate 
years and thereby understates the importance of the Temple Mount before the Six Day War.   
5
 Amnon Ramon, “Delicate Balances at the Temple Mount,” in Marshall Breger & Ora Ahimeir (eds.), Jerusalem: A 
City and Its Future (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 326. 
6
 Prime Minister Ehud Barak would not give up Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount (though he was ready to 
give up 93 percent of the West Bank), and Yasser Arafat was just as adamant.  Ron E. Hassner, War on Sacred 
Grounds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 80.  
7
 Ron E. Hassner, “The Pessimist’s Guide to Religious Coexistence,” in Marshall J. Breger et al (eds.),  Holy Places 
in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Confrontation and Coexistence.  (New York: Routledge, 2010), 153. 
8
 See secret discussions between Israeli and Palestinian leaders recently published by Al-Jazeera. Clayton Swisher.  
The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?  (Chatham: Hesperus Press, 2011). 
9
 While it cannot be disputed that these issues were central to the Mandate, they do not tell the full story.  Religion, 
religious hierarchies, and religious spaces played a major role in the history of the period.  My focus on religion is 
not based on the assumption that everyone in Palestine was devout, but on the fact that religion was the main 
organizing principle of Mandatory society.  The British, like the Ottomans before them, maintained a legal system 
that divided and isolated Palestine’s religious communities.  This legal system ensured that conflicts in Palestinian 
society almost always broke along religious lines. The Temple Mount complex stood at the center of one such 
conflict.  This structural connection between Mandatory law, Palestine’s fragmented religious society, and 
management of the Temple Mount lies at the heart of this thesis.   
3 
 
 
 
British, Arab, and Jewish— recognized the Temple Mount as profoundly sacred.  However, each 
approached the site very differently.  The British chose to govern it “hands off” for fear of 
upsetting the worldwide Muslim community.
10
   The Arab Muslim leaders who controlled it used 
its autonomous status to create a zone of de facto sovereignty and the center of a would-be 
independent Arab state in Palestine.  The site’s physical impregnability only reinforced its 
independence.
11
  Surrounded on all sides by walls, accessible only by a few gates, and 
honeycombed with subterranean passageways, the Temple Mount provided a natural sanctuary 
from government authority.  Meanwhile, Jews trying to create a national home in Palestine 
viewed unbridled Arab power inside the Temple Mount—Judaism’s ancient holy place—as an 
outrage, and began to devise their own plans to throw off British rule.   
     Stated simply, this paper argues that Britain’s non-policy on the Temple Mount undermined 
the Mandate project and ultimately contributed to the rise of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
12
  
Specifically, Britain’s policy of “affirmative deference” in this shared holy site exacerbated 
rather than defused tensions between Arabs and Jews.  This failure was at its base a failure of 
                                                          
10
 If Breger and Hammer are correct that sacred spaces should be evaluated on a continuum of holiness, the Temple 
Mount must certainly lie at the highest end of the spectrum.  Its shared significance to Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam makes it perhaps the most revered sacred space on earth.  See Marshall J. Breger and Leonard Hammer, “The 
Legal Regulation of the Holy Sites,” in Breger et al (eds.), Holy Places in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 26. 
11
 This paper notes to the dynamic nature of sacred space itself.  The Temple Mount is presented here not merely as 
a legal or political black box, but as a vibrant social and cultural space at the center of Palestine.  Sacred spaces, by 
their very nature, have the ability to powerfully shape surrounding societies and limit the authority of secular 
government.  In her book From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule, Abigail Jacobson 
highlights how space in general can impact local society: “Space and place are…intimately bound with the 
constitution of social identities, and are deeply embedded in historical conflicts and processes, such as war.  Urban 
space is viewed not as a passive, fixed, or abstract arena where things simply ‘happen,’ but rather as a site of 
political action that involves conflicts over the meanings and interpretations of public space.  History of people, 
then, is integrated here with history of place.”   Abigail Jacobson, From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between 
Ottoman and British Rule (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 53. 
12
 Nowhere in this paper do I argue that the Temple Mount was the only cause for the failure of the Mandate or the 
rise of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The wider clash between competing nationalisms over a finite piece of land is 
certainly the central theme.  However, I do contend that the inviolable status of the Temple Mount played a major 
role in limiting British law and thereby affecting the result of the Mandate experiment.   
4 
 
 
 
governance: by refusing to apply the rule of law to the site, Britain effectively created a zone of 
lawlessness at the center of Palestine that was bound to undermine the entire regime.  This 
argument is based on analysis of primary sources drawn from government records, personal 
memoirs, newspaper accounts, speeches, and religious literature from all three parties.
13
  By 
approaching the subject from three different perspectives, this paper attempts to reconstruct an 
objective picture of the Temple Mount as it actually functioned in Mandate society.
14
  At the 
very least, this paper hopes to explain the Mount’s seemingly “sudden” prominence after 1967.   
     Following a brief literature review, the first section of this paper details the formation of the 
British colonial regime and its approach toward the holy places.  The second section describes 
the consolidation of an organic Muslim regime inside the Temple Mount and its defense against 
Jewish and British encroachment.  The third and last section details the Jewish perspective on the 
Mount and how this perspective contributed to the birth of Jewish independence movement.  
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 This paper’s greatest methodological challenge is its author’s insufficient mastery of Arabic and inability to 
examine contemporary Arabic sources.  This challenge, while formidable, is minimized by using English 
translations of Arabic texts and speeches wherever possible.    
14
 It may be argued that viewing Palestinian society as three monolithic communities is an over-generalization that 
will skew analysis.  Assaf Likhovski has attacked this “essentializing” tendency in his recent study of Mandate law 
and identity: “The story of law in Palestine cannot be told on the basis of a reductionist framework in which Jews 
and British worked in tandem as colonizers and the Arabs were merely passive and muted victims,” he writes..  “Nor 
can this story be told on the basis of a simply binary framework that ignores internal conflicts and rifts within the 
three communities.  Instead the legal history of Palestine reveals a complex web of connections and conflicts within 
and between the three main groups that forces us to abandon the conventional framework, making us realize that 
British rule as well as Zionist and Arab nationalism represent phenomena that cannot be accurately captured by 
essentializing categories.”  Assaf Likhovski, Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006), 7.  While recognizing the fundamental truth of this statement, I would argue that 
ignoring the essential coherence of the British, Muslim, and Jewish communities in terms of their basic desires 
would be to deconstruct Mandate Palestine beyond all recognition.  A more pointed criticism would be that the 
Christian perspective is missing here.  In response, I would point out that Palestine’s Christian community was not 
involved in the Temple Mount conflict in any significant way.  
5 
 
 
 
II. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
     Focused analysis on the Temple Mount is lacking in current literature of the British 
Mandate.
15
  Most authors mention it only as a pretext for political activity or a convenient banner 
for leaders trying to rally the masses.  While neither of these characterizations is completely 
incorrect, there is a deeper history of the space that needs to be told.   
     Assaf Likhovski’s Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine is currently the leading work on the 
legal history of the Mandate.  Likhovski portrays Mandate law as a medium of cultural 
exchange—a “balancing act” between Western and non-Western culture, and “an arsenal of 
mediating tools” rather than a coherent body of legal thought.  In order to manage Palestine’s 
diverse population, the British maintained a legal regime that gave considerable autonomy to the 
country’s religious communities. These communities embraced Mandate law only insofar as it 
helped assert their identity and carve out a sphere of power.  For this reason, the Mandatory 
landscape was a web of overlapping and competing jurisdictions.  Likhovski focuses mainly on 
secular identities, and despite the universal title of his book virtually ignores religion and 
religious authority.  He makes no mention of the Holy Places.  This gap is a glaring one 
considering Palestine’s famous religious associations.  While Likhovski has contributed a 
monumental work to the history of the Mandate, more investigation into the link between law 
and religion is needed.  
                                                          
15
 The most exhaustive works on the Temple Mount focus primarily on events after June 1967.  See Shmuel 
Berkovitz, Ma Nora ha-Makom ha-Zeh! Kedusha, Politika, ve-Mishpat bi-Yerushalyim u-Mekomot ha-Kedushim bi-
Israel (Jerusalem: Karta, 2006); Yitzhak Reiter, Ribonut ha-El ve-ha-Adam: Kedusha, u-Merkaziut Politit be-Har 
ha-Bayit (Jerusalem: Mekhon Yerushalyim le-Chaker Israel, 2001); Nadav Shragai, Har Ha-Merivah: Ha-Ma’avak 
al Har ha-Bayit. Yehudim ve-Muslimim, Dat ve-Politika me’az 1967 (Jerusalem: Keter, 1995).  
6 
 
 
 
     Ronen Shamir does acknowledge religion in The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and 
Law in Early Mandate Palestine.
16
  However, Shamir’s focus is mainly on the conflict between 
the Hebrew Peace Courts (established by secular Jews before World War I to circumvent 
Ottoman and rabbinical authorities) and the pre-state Zionist institutions and rabbinical leaders 
(supported by the colonial regime).  Shamir turns the usual relationship between religion and 
state on its head.  Usually portrayed as enemies, Shamir describes them here as allies in the fight 
against the “organic” system of secular Hebrew Peace Courts.  He accuses Zionist leaders and 
Orthodox rabbis of joining to blot out these courts and “take over” Palestine’s legal system.  In 
doing so, the “Jewish State-ists” inherited the British colonial model and all its illegitimate 
trappings.  Shamir’s approach is notable for its distinction between “imposed” and “organic” 
authority. This distinction is relevant for examining the relationship between the British officials 
and indigenous Muslim leaders inside the Haram ash-Sharif.  Shamir’s approach is 
uncomfortably counterfactual, however, and he appears overly desirous to prove a “missed 
opportunity” in the history of Israel/Palestine.  He, too, makes no mention of the Holy Places.   
     Naomi Shepherd examines British administrative failures in her Ploughing Sand: British Rule 
in Palestine 1917-1948.
17
  Yet her chapter entitled “The Law Factory,” while fascinating, repeats 
the standard view that land and immigration were the only two legal issues worth mentioning.  A 
more stimulating account of the Mandate is Tom Segev’s One Palestine, Complete.
18
  Segev’s 
goal in this narrative work is both to entertain readers with fascinating stories of the period, but 
                                                          
16
 Ronen Shamir, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and Law in Early Mandate Palestine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
17
 Naomi Shepherd, Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine 1917-1948 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1999). 
18
 Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate. Transl. by Haim Watzman 
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2000). 
7 
 
 
 
also to complicate traditional historiography by exposing the dubious motives of all parties 
involved.  Rather than focus on Jewish heroes, Arab enemies, and indifferent British 
administrators, Segev tells stories that transgress these categories and spread the blame around.  
His work is revisionist in that it problematizes the idea that Zionism owed its success directly to 
British protection.  As with much literature on the Mandate, his focus is the British-Jewish 
dynamic and pays far too little attention to the Muslim perspective.   
     Other works have dealt with the Muslim community in more detail.  Perhaps the most well-
known is Yehoshua Porath’s two volume The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National 
Movement.
19
  Porath notes the centrality of the Haram during the period, but woefully leaves out 
an explanation of why it was significant to Muslims and Jews in the first place.  Uri 
Kupferschmidt’s The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine is 
another seminal work on the topic, and provides a major point of departure for this paper.
20
  
Kupferschmidt’s description of the inner workings of the Supreme Muslim Council is 
exhaustive, but his focus is too narrow and does not account for British and Jewish views of the 
Temple Mount.  He also falls into the common trap of depicting the Haram simply as a political 
tool for the ever-present Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini.  The Mufti receives more 
favorable treatment in Phillip Mattar’s The Mufti of Jerusalem, a revisionist work that challenges 
the longstanding belief that the Mufti was responsible for all that was wrong in Palestine.
21
  
While Mattar makes important new conclusions, his look at the Haram is routine and obligatory.   
                                                          
19
 Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 
20
 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine (Leiden: 
Brill, 1987). 
21
 Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
8 
 
 
 
     Although more abstract in its approach, Yaron Z. Eliav’s God’s Mountain: The Temple Mount 
in Time, Place, and Memory is helpful for seeing the Temple Mount as a historical character in 
its own right.
22
  Eliav describes the powerful influence of this sacred space on the people 
surrounding it down through history.  He accurately notes that “insufficient attention has been 
given to the way the Mount has functioned in and influenced history, to its conceptualization, 
and to the place it has occupied in the consciousness of those involved with it.”  Unfortunately, 
his narrative ends long before the British Mandate begins.   
     In addition to histories of the period, this paper also takes cues from recent scholarship at the 
intersection of law and geography.  Nicholas Blomley, one of the pioneers in this field, explores 
the spatial construction of law in his Law, Space, and Geographies of Resistance.
23
   Blomley 
depicts “law” as a diffuse set of power relations rather than a unified regime imposed from 
above.  Law, as he defines it, is not the result of social balance but an imbalanced framework of 
control that reflects and perpetuates social boundaries constructed in space.  Blomley’s view of 
power is Foucaldian and at times overly abstract.  However, his interrogation of legal norms and 
recognition of concurrent legal authorities is relevant to the colonial-indigenous dynamic that lies 
at the center of this paper. 
     This paper aims to fill the gap left by these other works.  By placing the Temple Mount front 
and center, it tells the deeper history of the space and defines its role at the beginning of this 
unique and significant conflict. 
 
      
                                                          
22
 Yaron Z. Eliav’s God’s Mountain: The Temple Mount in Time, Place, and Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005). 
23
 Nicholas Blomley, Law, Space, and Geographies of Resistance (New York: Guilford Press, 1994). 
9 
 
 
 
A hundred ancient cities, whose very names are now forgotten, have risen to greatness amid 
great empires, and have fallen into decay.  But Jerusalem has remained a City of Cities to 
millions who have never entered her gates, the capital of the ideal State, the goal of the unending 
pilgrimage.
24
 
 
The visitor who has visualized Jerusalem, and those in or about it, in the rosy tints of Scripture, is 
doomed to disillusion, swift and complete.  The inner city is a city of slums and smells, and a 
considerable number of the people in and about it are found to be a feckless folk, spoon-fed in 
idleness and fanaticism.
25
 
 
 
III. CRUSADERS OF LAW AND ORDER 
     The Allied armies breached the perimeter of the crumbling Ottoman Empire and arrived at the 
gates of Jerusalem in late 1917.  The Turks and Germans shortly withdrew northward, and 
Jerusalem’s Arab mayor surrendered to the Allies on December 9.
26
  Two days later, British 
General Sir Edmund Allenby entered as the city’s first Christian conqueror since the Crusades.  
Unlike his predecessors, Allenby was careful to demonstrate goodwill to the inhabitants and 
humility before the hallowed reputation of the city.
27
  Standing on the steps of the Tower of 
Herod, he announced that Southern Palestine was now under military occupation but that “every 
sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or 
                                                          
24
 “A New Era in Jerusalem,” The Times, Dec. 22, 1920, at 6.  
25
 “Jerusalem To-day: First Impressions,” The Times, May 11, 1920, at 15.  These are the words of G. B. Barnes, 
former Labour minister of the War Cabinet who was in Palestine during the Nebi Musa riots of April 1920. 
26
 The text of the statement of surrender read, “Due to the severity of the siege of the city and the suffering that this 
peaceful country has endured from your heavy guns; and for fear that these deadly bombs will hit the holy places, 
we are forced to hand over to you the city through Hussein Bey al-Husseini, the mayor of Jerusalem, hoping that 
you will protect Jerusalem the way we have protected it for more than five hundred years.” It was signed by Izzat 
Pasha, the Turkish governor of Jerusalem.  “My Last Days as an Ottoman Subject: Selections from Wasif 
Jawhariyyeh‘s Memoirs” (trans. by Amal Amireh), Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 2000), 31. 
27
 The British Crown had tangible interests in Palestine that demanded such a humble display.  Cabinet member 
Lord Curzon, like most of his colleagues, viewed the country as a strategic bulwark for the Suez Canal, the “nerve-
centre of the British Empire.”  Curzon felt that “any British statesman would indeed be blind who ever allowed the 
Turks to reappear in the Holy Land.”  The best policy would be to garner European support for a long-term British 
presence in Palestine by framing the situation in religious terms.  “The whole world,” he wrote, “America included, 
will wish this to be the last crusade for the expulsion of the Ottoman Turk, and the recovery of the Holy Places of 
Christendom.”  Lord Curzon, German and Turkish Territories Captured in the War, Dec. 5, 1917, CAB/24/4.   
10 
 
 
 
customary place of prayer of whatsoever form of the three religions will be maintained and 
protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faith they are sacred.”
28
   
     It was not coincidental that these were Allenby’s first words in Jerusalem.  The British were 
eager to show abundant neutrality in this city coveted by millions around the world.  “The steps 
taken on the occupation of the city of Jerusalem should ensure tranquillity [sic] and good 
feeling,” directed one British official to his colleagues just after the city’s capture.
29
  Britain’s 
audience was not only the local population.  Most important were the international stakeholders 
located in Rome, Russia, and across the Islamic world.
30
  By publicly abstaining from Palestine’s 
religious quarrels and showing deference to its holy places, the British hoped to play supreme 
mediator in mankind’s holiest city.
31
   
     The capture of Jerusalem was a major psychological victory for the British.
32
   In the midst of 
a brutal war, its moral significance far surpassed pure military concerns.
33
  As one soldier 
explained, “[O]ur prestige, which for three years had been at a very low ebb, by the capture of 
                                                          
28
 “Proclamation of General Allenby,” in Charles F. Horne (ed.), Source Records of the Great War, Vol. V (Stuart-
Copley Press, 1923), 417. 
29
 Foreign Office, Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report no. 46, Dec. 14, 1917, CAB/24/144, at 2. 
30
 At this point, the British were highly concerned about the Bolshevik menace rising in the east.  One official 
suggested that non-Bolshevik Russians might be “won” using Palestine-centered propaganda.  “It has been 
suggested…to make known to the Russian peasantry that the capture of Jerusalem will make their pilgrimages to the 
Holy Land easier.  If properly worked this would be most useful propaganda, as the revolutionary party will 
doubtless persuade the ignorant peasants that our taking of Jerusalem will hinder the pilgrimages, for which they 
save up their kopecks for years.”  Foreign Office, Eastern Report no. 46, Dec. 13, 1917, CAB/24/144, at 3. 
31
 British aims in governance were twofold: “(1) To ensure orderly government in a country where disorder would 
react upon neighbouring countries in which Great Britain is interested; and (2) to prevent the possibility of any of 
the international bodies interested in Palestine feeling resentment against Great Britain as a party to an arrangement 
there which they might consider unfair to themselves. In particular, His Majesty's Government desire to insure 
reasonable facilities in Palestine for Jewish colonization, without giving Arab or general Moslem opinion an 
opportunity for considering that Great Britain has been instrumental in handing over free Arab or Moslem soil to 
aliens.”  Foreign Office: Political Intelligence Department, Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and 
the Arabian Peninsula, Nov. 21, 1918, CAB/24/72, at 14. 
32
 Jacobson, Empire to Empire, 121. 
33
 Gaston Bodart, “The Conquest of Jerusalem,” in Source Records of the Great War, 403. 
11 
 
 
 
Jerusalem leapt at one bound to a height never before attained in Egypt.”
34
  The city’s ancient 
ambience and its moorings in the Judeo-Christian imagination inspired universal awe.  A reporter 
for The Times wrote, “British soldiers and officers are almost always reserved in the expression 
of religious emotion, but there are great and rare occasions when the ice of reserve melts, and the 
capture of Jerusalem was one of these.”
35
  For the British Empire, whose religious foundations 
are well known, taking the ancient City of David was inestimably significant.
36
     
     The primeval core of Palestine’s importance arguably lay in the Temple Mount, a small hill 
tucked inside in the southeastern corner of the Old City of Jerusalem.  The walled-off complex 
that dominated this hill rose majestically above the city and defined its skyline for miles.
37
   This 
Temple Mount was more than just a holy site: it was an active, three-dimensional space serving 
tens of thousands of local Muslims on a regular basis.  At its center lay “The Rock” (as-Sakhra 
in Arabic) and the “Foundation Stone” (Even Shtiyah in Hebrew)—a sacred rock formation that 
had been a place of Semitic worship for at least three thousand years.  Overtop the rock, the 
Israelite temples of Solomon and Herod had once stood.  The Muslim armies of the Caliph Omar 
had captured the site in the seventh century and converted it into an Islamic holy place, renaming 
it the Haram ash-Sharif or Noble Sanctuary.
38
  They had also constructed a decorative dome 
over the rock and a large mosque on the southern edge of the platform.  For the next thousand 
                                                          
34
 Antony Bluett, With Our Army in Palestine (London: Andrew Melrose Ltd., 1919), 221-222. 
35
 “Holy Places of Jerusalem,” The Times, Mar. 29, 1918, at 3. 
36
 For recent works on the religious character of the British Empire, see Hilary M. Carey, God’s Empire: Religion 
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years almost without interruption, this sacred complex had operated under the exclusive control 
of Muslims and remained inaccessible to most everyone else.   
     The First World War turned this and every other situation in Palestine on its head.  The region 
was abruptly cut off from its Greater Syrian setting and fenced in by arbitrary borders devised by 
Europeans.  Gone was the framework of Muslim government that had ruled the land for 
centuries.  Gone were the Islamic caliphate and its unified hegemony over the holy places of 
Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem.  The Christians controlled everything and were calling Jews to 
settle a newly-created state of Palestine.  “[A]fter the settlement of the Great War…,” writes one 
scholar, “the various communities of the Arab East found themselves to be nationals of 
independent political entities to which they owed no allegiance.”
39
  The Haram ash-Sharif would 
become important in this fluid environment as the one place in Palestine where Muslims could 
conduct their affairs independently. 
     Although the Haram had fallen into disrepair in the final years of the Ottoman Empire, it still 
retained its holy spell.  Visitors universally described it as a stunning contrast to the filthy streets 
of Jerusalem below.  One visitor was impressed by its “sunlit beauty” and its “strange and 
beautiful” tranquility.
40
  A British soldier felt a childlike sense of wonder gazing at the inside of 
al-Aqsa Mosque: “The size and the beauty of this place is beyond description…,” he wrote.  
“The dome is simply lovely, and is some of the most wonderful work of human hands I have 
ever seen.”
41
  British civic architect C.R. Ashbee probed the deeper ambience of the space: 
                                                          
39
 Abbas Kelidar, “States without Formation: The Political Evolution of State and Society in the Arab East,” Journal 
of Contemporary History, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), 319. 
40
 George Napier Whittingham, The Home of Fadeless Splendour: or, Palestine of Today (London: Hutchinson & 
Co., 1921), 142. 
41
 “The Holy Places of Jerusalem,” The Times, Oct. 28, 1918, at 5.  A more sarcastic American travel writer found 
comment futile. “Of the beauty of the glazed tiles…of the religious atmosphere of the interior, the awesome 
13 
 
 
 
Whenever I want to do a little quiet thinking—to dream—I go to the Haram al Sharif.  
There is no place like it in the world for silence, reverence, spaciousness, dignity, and the 
sun.  The nearest I can recall is some Greek temple, Girgenti perhaps.  But then the 
Haram is alive.
42
       
 
     How did the British approach this sacred space?  What influenced their decision to manage it 
the way they did?  This chapter introduces the British Mandate and its policy of affirmative 
deference on the Temple Mount.  The reason for this policy lay in the well-known sanctity of the 
place, the limiting power of religion more generally, and Britain’s self-conscious position as 
Christian ruler of a large part of the Islamic world. 
        
A. British Palestine: A Background 
     The creation of Palestine after World War I was one of the most significant events of the 
twentieth century.  In this one act, Great Britain laid the foundation for an ethno-religious and 
territorial conflict that shaped at least a century of world history.  Because the story of the 
Temple Mount is inextricably connected with this broader conflict, this section will explain the 
presence of the British in Palestine and the conflicting wartime promises that brought them there. 
     The British, like the French, pursued a civilizing mission in their imperial activity.
43
  They 
were accustomed to seizing foreign lands and bringing them under the rule of law.
44
  There was 
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initially no reason to believe that Palestine would be any different than India or Egypt; however, 
this ancient land presented several unique challenges that haunted the British until their final 
retreat in 1948.  Most visibly, the country stood mired in deep material depression.  It had 
virtually no physical infrastructure.
45
  The population had been ravaged by conscription, famine, 
and poverty during the war.
46
  The Turks and Germans had taken most of the food before 
retreating, and Jerusalem lay on the edge of starvation.
47
  For many months, the country was still 
submerged in war.  When Allenby entered Jerusalem, the battle lines were only a few thousand 
yards away.
48
   
     Palestine’s deeply spiritual atmosphere presented a more lasting challenge.  Despite a few 
pockets of secularism, religion was the dominant factor in Palestinian society.  The country was 
riven by a sectarian social structure called the millet that legally divided the population into self-
contained religious communities.  One British official arriving in country was surprised to find it 
“beset by a strange form of nationalism based not so much on race as on religion.”
49
   Traditional 
leaders still controlled most towns and villages.
50
  Muslims, Jews, and Christians frequently 
resorted to religious courts to resolve their disputes.
51
   Indeed, if one scholar was correct that 
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“legal unity is of the essence of sovereignty,” the Ottomans barely controlled Palestine before 
World War I and the British would not far surpass them.
52
   
     Jerusalem presented perhaps the most difficult challenge of all.  As the capital of British 
Palestine, the city’s natural spiritual significance was amplified tenfold.  The city had become an 
Ottoman administrative center in the mid-nineteenth century after European consulates began 
sprouting up to protect pilgrims and exert influence.
53
  Recognizing its growing significance, the 
Ottomans made Jerusalem the capital of its own semi-autonomous district in 1841 with a 
jurisdictional hinterland extending to Jaffa, Hebron, Gaza, and Beersheba.  The Ottomans 
managed the city from day to day with the help of a Muslim aristocracy whose competing 
families traced their ancestry back to the days of Muhammad.  These elites dominated the local 
political and religious posts.
54
  They were jealous of their independence, and were notoriously 
rebellious to the government in Constantinople.
55 
  In 1910, Jerusalem’s jurisdiction was 
extended to Nablus.  These expanded legal borders enclosed what could arguably be viewed as 
an organic Arab Muslim “Palestine” prior to British arrival.
56
    
     Jerusalem’s greatest difficulty lay in its dense concentration of holy sites.  Of these, the 
British identified the Haram ash-Sharif as particularly sensitive.  “The Dome of the rock,” wrote 
one official, “which was the point of prayer to which Mohammed himself turned, before he 
established Mecca, gives Jerusalem a special sanctity to Moslems of all sects.”  Both before and 
after Allenby’s entry, policymakers were unanimous that Muslims should be given complete 
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control of the site and all other Islamic holy places.  Making this concession, they believed, 
would soften the impact of the “Crusader victory” and even prove a positive force for Britain’s 
image.  “The effect of the fall of Jerusalem will…be considerable among Moslems as a whole,” 
one official predicted, “and have a tendency to produce Anglophil [sic] sentiments, and to lessen 
the malignant power of political Pan-Islamists.”
57
  
     But the British created their biggest challenges to governance before they even entered 
Palestine.  Three conflicting promises made during the course of World War I profoundly 
affected the future of post-war Palestine and the wider Middle East.  The Balfour Declaration 
was undoubtedly the most radical of these promises.  A month before Allenby took Jerusalem, 
British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour wrote a public letter to Baron Walter Rothschild, leader 
of Britain’s Jewish community, announcing that Great Britain “view[ed] with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”  Balfour pledged that the 
British would “use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights 
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine[.]”  His plan was to carve “a small notch” out of 
the Arab world and set it aside for Jewish immigration and development.
58
  Although Zionism 
had already existed for several decades, backing from the world’s most powerful nation signaled 
a major turning point in its history. 
     But British had made another promise during the war.  In 1915, British governor of Egypt Sir 
Henry McMahon had secretly contacted Sheikh Hussein bin Ali of Arabia and asked him to lead 
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an Arab revolt against the Ottomans.  As custodian of the shrines at Mecca and Medina, Hussein 
ostensibly had the legitimacy to lead such a revolt.
59
  McMahon promised Hussein a massive 
swath of the Ottoman Empire for his efforts—a territory that would form the basis for a unified 
Arab kingdom in the Middle East.
60
  For Hussein and others who acted upon this promise, the 
Balfour Declaration came as a shock.
61
  A deep feeling of betrayal overtook them, and it was 
only magnified when they learned that Britain had made yet a third promise.  This promise, 
known as the “Sykes-Picot Agreement,” was executed between Britain and France with the 
support of Russia for the purposes of divvying up the Ottoman Empire between themselves.
62
   
Colonel Ronald Storrs, the first military governor of Jerusalem, described the feeling of Arabs in 
Palestine: 
With the British “Liberation” of their country they found their hopes not accomplished 
but extinguished.  Throughout history the conqueror had kept for himself the territory he 
conquered (save in those rare instances when he returned it to the inhabitants): and that 
Britain should take and keep Palestine would have been understood and welcomed.  
Instead she proposed to hand it, without consulting the occupants, to a third party: and 
                                                          
59
 One British official described Hussein as “the High Priest and religious Chief of Islam” whose fight to liberate the 
Islamic holy places from the hands of the Turk would convince the Muslim world that “we are, in fact, fighting a 
‘Jehad’  or Holy War against the Turks and their German masters.”  Foreign Office, Eastern Report no. 2, Feb. 7, 
1917, CAB/24/143, at 10.  The focus on liberation of the holy places was indeed a major part of British propaganda.   
60
 The McMahon promises specifically excluded certain territory from Hussein’s would-be Arab kingdom, namely, 
“The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, 
Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.”  The 
exact meaning of this sentence would be debated ad nauseam over subsequent decades.  The British and the Zionists 
claimed that the excluded area encompassed the Ottoman vilayet of Beirut and the independent district of Jerusalem.  
Arabs on the other hand argued that Jerusalem did not lie west of Beirut, and as such had not been excluded from 
McMahon’s promises.  For his part, McMahon later stated that he had intended to exclude all of Palestine lying west 
of the Jordan River.  See Letter from Sir Henry McMahon to John Shuckburgh, Mar. 12, 1922, quoted in Efraim & 
Inari Karsh, Empires of Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 238.  See also “Emir Fiesal and Chaim Weizmann: Agreement (January 3, 1919),” in 
Walter Laquer & Barry Rubin (eds.), The Israel-Arab Reader. 6th ed.
 
(New York: Penguin, 2001), 13-16. 
61
 Despite their push for European control in the Middle East, the British and French were not ignorant of Arab 
opinion.  Officials in London kept a very close eye on feeling amongst the Arabs of Palestine.  One official warned, 
“[O]ur adoption of Zionism and our capture of Jerusalem will tend to a certain extent to somewhat abate Arab 
enthusiasm..... There is no doubt…that this aspect of the situation requires careful consideration and attention, 
otherwise the enemy will not be slow to profit by the event.”  War Cabinet, Eastern Report no. 46, Dec. 14, 1917, 
CAB/24/144. 
62
 “The Sykes-Picot Agreement,” in Laquer & Rubin (eds.), The Israel-Arab Reader, 13-16. 
18 
 
 
 
what sort of third party!  To the lowest and (in Arab eyes) the least desirable specimens 
of a people reputed parasitic by nature, heavily subsidized, and supported by the might of 
the British Empire.
63
 
 
     Although favored under the Balfour Declaration, the Zionists also became disappointed by the 
British.  They had been promised a national home—an unprecedented idea to be sure—but they 
quickly comprehended practical limits of this promise on the ground.  Rather than receiving 
proactive support from British officials, the Jews received indifference and even interference at 
times.  Most military officers viewed Balfour’s promise as a fool’s errand, the product of 
sentimental imaginations back in London.
64
  Many of them had spent careers in Egypt, Sudan, 
and India, and were more comfortable with Islamic culture.
65
  Some were outright anti-Semites.
66
  
It soon became clear to everyone that, despite the Balfour Declaration, the military government 
of Palestine was not sympathetic to Zionism.
67
  The Jews, like the Arabs, were confused and 
suspicious of Britain’s ultimate intentions.
68
 
     Britain’s three promises defined the general outline of the Mandate: Muslims claiming 
independence, Jews claiming the right to a national home, and the British claiming the right to 
decide their joined destiny.  The promises also defined the conflict around the Temple Mount 
complex.  Arabs claimed it as an autonomous area and the would-be capital of their independent 
state.  Jews claimed it as the center of their ancient glory, and viewed its Western Wall as the 
cornerstone of their national future.  The British meanwhile enjoyed possession of the Temple 
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Mount and all its sacred associations, but found maintenance of law and order at the site 
impossible.  I contend that Britain’s failure to resolve its three competing promises impaired its 
ability to resolve disputes at the Temple Mount as it did in the rest of Palestine.  By promising 
Arabs an independent state and Jews a national home, and by limiting the power to govern to 
themselves only, the British turned the Temple Mount into a microcosm of the wider conflict.   
     The Treaty of Versailles ended World War I in June 1919 and gave birth to the League of 
Nations.  The establishment of this international entity tasked with preserving world peace was 
truly unprecedented.  In April 1920, the Allied Powers met in San Remo, Italy, to discuss the fate 
of captured Ottoman territories.  There it was tentatively decided to approve the Balfour 
Declaration and give Great Britain a “mandate” to manage Palestine, although the Mandate’s 
terms were left to be decided later.
69
  In anticipation of receiving it, the British ended military 
administration of the country and instituted a civil government on July 1, 1920.
70
  This signaled a 
major shift in the country’s political system and a sweeping change in administrative style.
71
  Sir 
Herbert Samuel, an accomplished British Jew and Zionist, was appointed to lead the new 
government and apply the terms of the Mandate.  This Mandate stood “in favour of the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” while at the same time 
ordering that “nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine[.]”  This paradox in policy goals was nowhere 
more evident than in Britain’s policy toward the holy places. 
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B. Towards a Holy Places Policy 
     How to honor promises made to two nations for the same land?  Colonel Ronald Storrs 
described Britain’s dilemma as “how A should ‘restore’ the property of B to C without 
deprivation of B.”
72
  This dilemma was vividly illustrated at the Temple Mount complex.  This 
sacred space belonged to Palestine’s Muslim community, but it also belonged to the Jews in a 
way that was difficult to ignore.  The space was recognized early as a potential challenge to law 
and order.  Two weeks before the Balfour Declaration went public, Lord Curzon identified the 
Temple Mount as an insuperable obstacle facing any potential Jewish state in Palestine.  
Jerusalem was the only possible Jewish capital, but Curzon knew that Muslims would never 
allow Jews to take the Haram ash-Sharif.  He believed that the only hope for the British was to 
set up a European-style government, guarantee the safety of the holy places, give control of the 
Haram to the Muslims, allow Jews to buy land, and protect equal rights for everyone.
73
   
     I would argue that Britain’s policy toward the Islamic holy places can best be described as 
“affirmative deference.”  That is, the British enforced a proactive policy of non-intervention and 
neutrality in Islamic sacred space.  This policy was intended as a visible departure from the 
“policy” of the Latin Crusaders.  Those bloody warriors had shown little regard for the holy 
places when they had arrived in the eleventh century: 
[T]he pilgrims entered the city, pursuing and killing the Saracens up to the Temple of 
Solomon, where the enemy gathered in force. The battle raged throughout the day, so that 
the Temple was covered with their blood. When the pagans had been overcome, our men 
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seized great numbers, both men and women, either killing them or keeping them captive, 
as they wished.
74
  
 
     The British knew how Muslims remembered the Crusades, and wanted desperately to dispel 
this memory.
75
  Just prior to Allenby’s entry, a British official in Constantinople suggested that a 
proclamation be made “announcing that we are the protectors of the Moslem religion and would 
pay every respect to the Moslem Holy Places.”
76
   This suggestion was followed to the letter.  
“Guards have been placed over the holy places,” Allenby reported to his superiors soon after his 
arrival.  “The Mosque of Omar and the area around it have been placed under Moslem control, 
and a military cordon of Mohammedan [Indian Muslim] officers and soldiers has been 
established around the mosque.  Orders have been issued that no non-Moslem is to pass within 
the cordon without permission of the Military Governor and the Moslem in charge.”
77
  
Meanwhile, Lord Balfour dispatched a telegram to Sharif Hussein reassuring him that the Allies 
would appoint a regime “approved of by the world” to manage Palestine’s holy sites.  Muslim 
authority over Islamic holy sites would be undisputed, he promised.  “As regarded the mosque of 
Omar,” he explained, “it would be considered as a Moslem concern alone and would not be 
subjected, directly or indirectly, to any non-Moslem authority.”
78
   Britain’s policy of affirmative 
deference encouraged Muslim autonomy over the holy sites in an effort to show goodwill. 
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     The few scholars who note the significance of the Haram ash-Sharif at this time usually 
ignore its connection with British policy at other Islamic holy places in the region.  Hundreds of 
miles away, the British were also guaranteeing the safety of the two shrines at Mecca and 
Medina and the Shiite shrines of Iraq.
79
  In the absence of a caliphate, Great Britain stood as the 
effective guardian of these holy places.  This situation vexed Muslims around the world.  In mid-
1919, protestors in places as remote as Samarkand and Tashkent were calling for Muslims to 
unite in defense of their holy places.  The feelings of Indian Muslims were a special concern to 
Great Britain.
80
  In October 1919, ten thousand members of the “Bombay Caliphate Committee” 
gathered to condemn European dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and seizure of the holy 
places.
81
  In February 1921, a delegation of Indian Muslims told a conference of Allied powers 
that, “All Arab provinces should be given complete autonomy without any direct or indirect 
control or interference of any non-Muslim Power. They should be left alone to themselves as the 
Mussalmans of India consider it contrary to the last will and injunction of the Holy Prophet that 
any non-Muslim Tower should exercise any control or authority over these provinces.”  The 
delegation called for sovereignty to be restored to the Turkish sultan, the only true Caliph of 
Islam.
82
  Britain scrambled to reassure Muslims under its dominion that Britain would render 
unto Allah that which was his. 
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     The government in Palestine pursued affirmative deference under the principle of the status 
quo.  This term of law and art had its roots in the nineteenth century when Ottoman officials had 
attempted to resolve Christian disputes over their holy sites.
83
  The basic idea was to “freeze” a 
sacred space in time with all the rights attached thereto.  Sultan Abdul Mecid was the first to 
implement the idea when he published a set of decrees in 1852 on management of the Christian 
holy sites.
84
  The British seized on this attractive “non-policy” and made it the bedrock of their 
administration.  Storrs called it their “strong tower of defence against the encroachments from all 
quarters.”
85
  Even urban planners felt hemmed in by its intangible power.  “Here is a force that 
often makes for what is picturesque and conservative,” wrote one planner, “but as often checks 
the administrator in genuine and rational improvement, because the sanction for what he wants to 
do rests not in the city itself, but in the great world outside somewhere, hidden away.”
86
 
      The obvious problem was that the status quo stood at odds with the goals of the Balfour 
Declaration.
87
  Zionism by its definition sought to transform Palestine into a Jewish homeland, 
and the British now openly supported this plan.  Such a transformation would logically alter 
every aspect of life in Palestine including the holy places.  Although the status quo was a 
pragmatic response to sensitive issues, it was ignorant of the fact that Jewish immigration was 
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destined to change the face of the country.
88
  The more the Jewish community grew, the less it 
would be content with Arab dominance and vice versa.
89
 
     It should be noted that the British intended the status quo only as a temporary remedy.
90
  They 
recognized the impossibility of pleasing everyone and doubted their ability to make rules that 
would be accepted by the world.  It was decided that a final resolution could only be provided by 
an international legal body constituted under the League of Nations.  This international body had 
been called for both by the King-Crane Commission and Article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres, in 
addition to the Mandate for Palestine itself.
91
  Throughout the period, the British remained 
convinced that only this body had the legitimacy to resolve holy places disputes.
92
  However, the 
Holy Places Commission called for under Article 14 of the Mandate was never created due to 
disagreement among the Christian powers.  As one British analyst wrote, “[I]n Palestine there are 
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international religious interests so important, and so difficult to reconcile, that they almost 
overshadow the internal problems of the native inhabitants.”
93
   
      The Christian sects—primarily the Latin and Orthodox churches—had been arguing for 
centuries over control of Jerusalem’s holy sites.  Since the mid-nineteenth century, their spheres 
of power had been frozen by the status quo.  With the arrival of the British, however, they found 
a new opportunity to jockey for power.
94
  The Vatican was especially interested in negotiations 
over the plan to divide the Middle East into mandates.
95
  The Vatican’s main goal was to expand 
Latin influence in Jerusalem at the expense of the other Christian churches.  This story is one of 
the less studied aspects of the Temple Mount complex.
96
  When told, however, it reveals that the 
Vatican played a part, however peripheral, in instigating the Wailing Wall riots of 1929. 
     The British Mandate was not officially approved until 1922, a full five years after Allenby 
took Jerusalem.  The delay was caused by several factors, most notably Catholic filibustering in 
the League of Nations.
97
  On November 2, 1921, Arab riots in Jerusalem killed five Jews.
98
  For 
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several weeks, Jews refrained from visiting the Western Wall for fear of being harmed.
99
  The 
Jewish National Assembly in Palestine (the Va’ad Le’umi) appealed to the British government 
for protection of Jewish rights at the Wall, but resolved to wait until the formation of the Holy 
Places Commission to make a final determination.
 100
   
     Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill convened the Cairo Conference in 1921 in the wake of 
regional unrest to plan the future of the British Middle East.  One of the main items on his 
agenda was to resolve the gridlock over the holy places.  After considerable discussion, the 
conference resolved to recommend to the League that the Holy Places Commission be comprised 
of six jurists—two Christians (Catholic and Orthodox), two Muslims (Sunni and Shi’i), and two 
Jews (Zionist and Orthodox)—and chaired by a British official. The government of Palestine 
would also hold a seat on the commission.  In making its rulings, the commission would consult 
with specially-constituted religious panels that would argue their interests on behalf of 
coreligionists.
101
      
     The British government presented Churchill’s proposal to the League of Nations and asked it 
to approve the mandates for Syria and Palestine.  Leaving these territories in limbo would 
gravely prejudice the work of the Mandatory powers.
102
  Britain also requested the establishment 
of the Holy Places Commission enumerated in Article 14: 
In view of the world wide importance and interest attaching to the obligations which 
Article 14 will impose, and seeing that it has not yet been found possible for the Council 
to approve the Draft Mandate, His Majesty’s Government are of opinion that it is highly 
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desirable that the appointment of the Commission in question should be undertaken 
without further delay.
103
 
 
     The Catholic powers refused to acquiesce.  “It is no exaggeration,” Balfour cabled back to 
London, “that the reluctance of the French, Polish, Spanish, Italian and Brazilian representatives 
on the Council to discuss now the Palestine mandate or the question of the chairmanship of the 
Holy Places Commission has been due to the representations which have been made to their 
Governments by the Papal representatives.”  Balfour asked the League to recall Britain’s well-
known tradition of fairness.  “We are a Protestant country,” he told the Council, “but I boldly say 
that I do not believe that in any country, Protestant or Catholic, has the Catholic religion received 
fairer or more generous treatment than it has within the British Isles.”
 104
 The British repeated its 
support for Churchill’s model.
105
  However, this model was unsatisfactory to the Catholic 
countries and the gridlock remained unresolved.
106
     
     The Council met again in London in July 1922, and the Catholic bloc demanded answers 
from the British.  Who would form the majority on the commission?  Would the commission be 
charged with defining a new legal regime at the holy places?  Balfour stressed Britain’s 
impartiality but the Catholics remained unconvinced.  Exasperated, Balfour offered a 
compromise: if the Council agreed to approve the mandates for Syria and Palestine, Article 14 
would be rewritten so that the commission’s jurisdiction and structure could be contemplated at a 
later date.  Balfour’s compromise succeeded, and the Council approved the mandates on July 24, 
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1922.
107
  Unfortunately, this compromise was partly responsible for delaying resolution to the 
Temple Mount question for so long.   
     Mandates were new to the world of international law.  As one American lawyer put it, 
“nothing of the same legal nature had ever done before.”
108
  Lord Balfour defined a mandate as 
“a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on the sovereignty which they obtained over 
conquered territories” to be carried out for the “general welfare of mankind.”  This idea of 
managing conquered territories as a trust for the world was an innovation.  The idea was to place 
backward peoples under the tutelage of wiser nations to learn the habits of good governance.
109
  
The League of Nations would act as the “trustee acting in the interest of the community of 
nations” and would hold “the relation of a guardian to a ward” with respect to the territories 
under its mandate.
110
  Of course, such a program begs many questions about the intentions of its 
creators. 
     The mandate system was not without criticism.
111
  Many viewed it as an unwarranted novelty 
in international relations.  Implementing such an awkward system, they said, would be plagued 
by all sorts of practical problems.   Who would hold sovereignty over a mandated territory, the 
mandatory power or the inhabitants?  Issues of indigenous rights, immigration, and legal title 
muddied the waters.  Others saw the Mandate system as a thin cloak for imperialism.  Its 
legitimacy was suspect in that Mandatory powers made decisions “dictated obviously by their 
own interest in the first instance, and probably hard, if not impossible, to justify if regarded 
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solely from the point of view of the peoples entrusted to them.”
112
  One British statesman 
claimed that the “system of Mandates differ[ed] only in theory from actual annexation.”
113
    
     In Palestine, the mandate was heavily criticized.
114
  It was challenged perhaps most 
vociferously by the country’s Arabs.  “From the beginning, the Arabs deemed the Mandate, an 
instrument entered into without their consent, as void, and considered its terms, in their entirety, 
arbitrary in character,” wrote one Arab lawyer in Palestine.  They argued that Mandate was 
contrary to Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which called for strictly 
“administrative assistance” in establishing self-governing states in former Ottoman territories.  In 
addition, the Mandate’s favored treatment of Jews was unlawful.  They thus deemed the 
instrument to be illegitimate, and dismissed full cooperation with the British as impossible.
115
 
     The Mandate did make specific provision for Muslim sovereignty over Islamic holy places in 
the country.  Article 13 stated, “[N]othing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon 
the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred 
shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.”  This provision had stayed intact through 
successive drafts of the Mandate, and effectively carved out de jure zones of Muslim autonomy 
inside Palestine.
116
  Two years later, the British enacted the Palestine (Holy Places) Order-in-
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Council.  This law formally removed the holy places from the jurisdiction of Palestine’s civil 
courts and assigned resolution of disputes at these places to the executive branch:   
[N]o cause or matter in connection with the Holy Places or religious buildings or sites in 
Palestine, or the rights or claims relating to the different religious communities in 
Palestine shall be heard or determined by any Court in Palestine. Provided that nothing 
herein contained shall affect or limit the exercise by the Religious Courts of the 
jurisdiction conferred upon them by, or pursuant to, the said Palestine Order-in-Council. 
If any question arises whether any cause or matter comes within the terms of the 
preceding Article hereof, such question shall, pending the constitution of a Commission 
charged with jurisdiction over the matters set out in the said Article, be referred to the 
High Commissioner, who shall decide the question after making due enquiry into the 
matter in accordance with such instruction as he may receive from one of His Majesty's 
Principal Secretaries of State. The decision of the High Commissioner shall be final and 
binding on all parties. 
 
     The (Holy Places) Order-in-Council was highly significant in that it made matters connected 
to the holy places political questions above the purview of ordinary justice.
117
  The law’s 
ostensible purpose was to withdraw civil jurisdiction over the sites until the Holy Places 
Commission came into being.
118
  However, because the commission was never created, British 
policy on the Mount effectively remained a non-policy.  They relied on executive decision-
makers to handle sensitive disputes, while disregarding the fact that these officials would be 
highly averse to ruling on these disputes in the interests of security.   The British, it seems, were 
not cognizant of how indigenous authority inside the Temple Mount could legitimize and 
empower indigenous leaders seeking to destabilize the regime.
119
 
     Overall, British policy on the Mount was driven by a fear of triggering religious conflict in 
the local and international arena.  Tasked with managing one of the world’s holiest lands, the 
British followed a policy of affirmative deference toward the country’s Muslim community as 
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well as the Vatican.  Their already precarious position as rulers of Jerusalem was further 
undermined by promising Palestine three times over to competing parties.  The results of these 
promises are perhaps nowhere better demonstrated than in the conflict over the Temple Mount’s 
Western Wall, where the conflict finally bubbled over into the Wailing Wall riots of 1929.  The 
following chapter examines the origins of these riots and challenges commonly-held ideas about 
the motivations of the parties involved.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
I have often wondered whether those who criticized us in Europe and America could have the faintest 
conception of the steep, narrow and winding alleys within the Old City of Jerusalem, the series of 
steps up or down which no horse or car can ever pass, the deadly dark corners beyond which a whole 
family can be murdered out of sight or sound of a police post not a hundred yards away.  What did 
they know of the nerves of Jerusalem, where in times of anxiety the sudden clatter on the stones of an 
empty petrol tin will produce a panic?
120
 
 
 
IV. WALL OF THE WORLDS 
     In his classic history of the Supreme Muslim Council under the Mandate, Uri Kupferschmidt 
describes the attitude of Palestine’s Muslim community as “Islam on the defensive.”  Severed 
from the Ottoman Empire and surrounded by Christians and Jews, many Arabs turned to Islam as 
the most important aspect of their identity.  Consequently, they took every opportunity to reify 
and give outward expression to their faith.  Kupferschmidt is careful to qualify this Islamic 
revival as “subjective and passing,” but notes it as a direct reaction to Jewish and Christian 
advances.  Religious symbols and holy places took on increased importance, and even prayers 
became politicized.  He notes how the Supreme Muslim Council “turned sanctified places into 
political symbols,” and how the call for the defense of the holy places emerged—“[o]r, 
rather…was gradually discovered as a suitable medium to arose the religious susceptibilities of 
the masses who remained indifferent to nationalistic slogans[.]”
121
     
     Kupferschmidt is generally suspicious of the Supreme Muslim Council and its proclaimed 
attachment to the holy places.  Invocation of sacred space was, in his analysis, mere political 
gamesmanship.  The holy places were not important to the Council in and of themselves, but 
only as a convenient means for rallying the masses against the Jews.  This explanation is 
commonly accepted by scholars who often assume that Haj Amin al-Husseini “played up” the 
                                                          
120
 Ronald Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (New York: Putnam & Sons, 1937), 348.  Colonel Storrs was 
the first British governor of Jerusalem. 
121
 Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, 221-254. 
33 
 
 
 
Jewish bogeyman and convinced Muslim peasants that the Jews wanted to take the Haram to suit 
his political program.  This “lie,” disseminated by elites, is assumed to be the main cause for the 
Wailing Wall riots. 
     In this section, I attempt to show that this assumption is incorrect.  While Kupferschmidt’s 
description of “Islam on the defensive” is generally on point, his assessment of the importance of 
the Haram to Palestine’s Muslim community is grossly understated.  I argue that the Haram was 
critically important to Muslim identity and contemporary visions of Arab self-determination.  
The Haram was the country’s central Muslim sanctuary and the nucleus of an organic 
jurisdiction that survived from Ottoman times.  Haj Amin did not manipulate Arabs to believe a 
lie; he simply articulated what he and the rest of his community actually believed.  The fear that 
Jews would take the Haram—not altogether unfounded considering their historic attachment to 
the site and their aggressive activity in the rest of Palestine—was not feigned.  In fact, it had 
existed since the beginning of British rule.  The underlying clash that sparked the Wailing Wall 
riots was, I argue, a struggle between preserving Muslim authority in the Haram and a struggle to 
establish Jewish authority at the Haram’s Western Wall.   
 
A. The Arab State of Palestine 
      If Palestine existed at all as an identifiable unit prior to the arrival of the British, its historic 
center undoubtedly lay in Jerusalem.  Of course “Palestine” did not exist as a real location before 
1917 except in the minds of Europeans.
122
  Under the Ottomans, the Eastern Mediterranean had 
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been divided into several districts, none of which corresponded with what later became British 
Palestine.  To its inhabitants the region was part of Bilad ash-Sham, or Greater Syria.   
      The increased prominence of Jerusalem after 1841 marked a major shift in the country’s 
power dynamic.
123
    Authority had been previously concentrated with rural sheikhs who 
managed communities and villages according to ancient custom.  After 1841, power shifted to an 
aristocracy of prominent Muslim families living in Jerusalem.  These families held practical 
control over the city and its hinterland by dominating the local Ottoman government and clerical 
posts attached to the Haram.  These aristocrats, or effendi, derived power from their ancestry and 
their position as mediators between Istanbul and the local community.
124
  In this way they 
consolidated vast wealth and lands in the surrounding countryside.  When the British arrived, 
they found that the Husseini family was the most dominant in Jerusalem.  Since the 1908 Young 
Turk revolution, the Husseins had been pioneering Arab nationalism in Palestine.
125
 Unlike some 
other families, the Husseini approach to Arab nationalism had a distinct Islamic flavor.
126
   
     With the arrival of the British, the Muslim aristocracy suffered a crippling blow.  The source 
of its power—the backing of the Ottoman Empire—was suddenly gone.  No longer could elites 
operate with impunity in the local environment.  No longer could they even claim preeminence 
as Muslims under a Muslim government.
127
  Their power was now confined almost exclusively 
to matters touching on religion and tradition.  For obvious reasons, religion thus became 
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immensely important for Muslims trying to distinguish themselves from foreigners and to lay the 
groundwork for an authentic Arab State of Palestine.   
    Britain’s official mission was to foster the establishment of a self-governing state—a 
development that Palestine’s Arabs universally welcomed.  Holding a clear demographic 
majority in the country, they understood that self-government would necessarily entail the 
creation of an Arab state.  They rejected any excuse for delaying the establishment of this state 
based on promises made by Sir Henry McMahon.   Musa Kazem Husseini wrote to Winston 
Churchill stating, “Whilst the position in Palestine is, as it stands to-day, with the British 
Government holding authority by an occupying force, and using that authority to impose upon 
the people against their wishes a great immigration of alien Jews…no constitution which would 
fall short of giving the People of Palestine full control of their own affairs could be 
acceptable.”
128
      
     In the absence of democratic government and political parties, Palestinian society was guided 
solely by its sectarian structure.  The British chose to leave much of Ottoman law and its millet 
system intact.
129
  This system was based formal grants of legal autonomy to Palestine’s religious 
communities.  While progressive in one sense, the millet reinforced religious divides in 
Palestinian society and inhibited any meaningful integration.  The most dominant millet (the 
Arabic word millah means “nation”) was naturally the Arab Muslim community.  Under the 
Ottomans, this community had been favored above the rest.  “The millet system of the Ottoman 
Empire…while providing diverse religious groups with control over their internal affairs,” writes 
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one scholar, “also maintained Islamic hegemony by institutionalizing local social boundaries and 
by asserting the primacy of Islamic law in conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims.”
130
   By 
leaving the millet intact the British perpetuated traces of Muslim hegemony, of which Islamic 
law provided the essential foundation.
131
  In late 1918, the military government enacted the 
Moslem Religious Courts Regulation giving appellate review to the Sharia Court of Appeal 
based in Jerusalem.
132
  By 1921, sharia courts of first instance were hearing twenty percent of 
Palestine’s non-criminal cases.  At the appellate level, they were hearing twenty-five percent.
133
   
     Arab desires for self-determination grew stronger as the British regime continued.
134
  On 
February 27, 1920, over a thousand Arab Muslims and Christians joined for the first combined 
demonstration of Arab nationalism.
135
  A few weeks later, a group of Arabs attacked Jews 
praying at the Western Wall and mauled an old rabbi.
136
  Muslim leaders inside the Haram 
prevented the philanthropic Pro-Jerusalem Society from completing a scenic pathway along the 
ramparts of the Old City by refusing to allow engineers access to parts of the wall inside the 
Haram.  Waqf officials also obstructed efforts to restore the Tariq Bab al-Silsileh, a famous street 
in Jerusalem.
137
  These activities were intended as open assertions of Arab authority over 
Jerusalem’s physical space. 
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     Serious riots broke out in Jerusalem for the first time in April 1920.  Tens of thousands of 
Arabs had converged on Jerusalem from all over Palestine for that year’s Nebi Musa 
pilgrimage.
138
   Unluckily for the British, the event happened to coincide with the crowing of 
King Faisal in Damascus as “King of Syria and Palestine.”  Damascus had always been the chief 
city of Greater Syria, and many Arabs in Palestine looked to King Faisal as their rightful king.  
As the pilgrimage began, a crowd of about 70,000 Arabs took to Jerusalem’s streets and listened 
to impassioned speeches calling for casting off British rule and uniting Syria and Palestine under 
the leadership of Faisal.  The Grand Mufti of Palestine, Musa Kazem al-Husseini, delivered a 
heated speech to the crowd while his brother, a former Ottoman army officer named Haj Amin 
al-Husseini, called upon Arabs to proclaim allegiance to Faisal.
139
  Stirred with emotion, the 
crowd suddenly rose up and turned on the city’s Jewish residents.
140
   
 
     
Colonel Storrs later said that news of the riots struck him like “a sword into my heart.”
141
  In a 
moment “all the carefully built relations of mutual understanding between British, Arabs and 
Jews seemed to flare away in an agony of fear and hatred.”
142
  These riots were the first real sign 
that the British mission in Palestine might not go as smoothly as planned.  In a report to the 
British parliament, however, the High Commissioner of Palestine Sir Herbert Samuel tried to 
downplay anti-Zionist feeling among the Arabs.  “Many men of education and enlightenment 
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among the Arabs took no part…in this antagonism,” he wrote.  “They recognized that the fears 
that had been expressed were illusory.”
143
  The Times optimistically reported that the riots had 
likely “cleared the air.”
144
  However, this optimism could not obscure the fundamental conflict 
festering beneath the surface. 
     Two months after the riots, Faisal was chased out of Damascus by the French—a major blow 
to Arab nationalism.  Palestinian Arabs suddenly found themselves without a king and 
permanently disconnected from Greater Syria.
145
  Jerusalem, whose importance has already been 
noted, now became even more significant as the rallying point of Palestinian Arab identity.  The 
British, sensing their dominion beginning to unravel, decided to incorporate the old Ottoman 
aristocracy into the government.  The Husseini family especially benefited from this new 
arrangement, and Musa Kazem al-Husseini received charge of the Arab Executive Committee.  
The British knew the power of the Husseinis in local Arab society and conferred on Musa Kazem 
no less than three powerful titles: Head of Awaqf (Islamic endowments), President of the Sharia 
Court of Appeal, and Grand Mufti of Palestine.  In 1921, Musa Kazem died and the British 
appointed his brother Haj Amin to replace him.
146
  In November of that year, the British 
convened Muslim leaders to decide long-term management of Islamic affairs.  Following intense 
negotiations, the government established the Supreme Muslim Council.
147
   Although meant 
merely to supervise Islamic affairs, this organic Arab regime quickly carved out a sphere of 
unprecedented power in Palestine.
148
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     The Supreme Muslim Council consisted of five elected members: a president and four other 
officials.
149
  Its official jurisdiction lay in managing the machinery of Islam: administering and 
controlling awqaf,
150
 approving the waqf budget, nominating judges and inspectors for the sharia 
courts, and appointing muftis and administrative officials.
151
  Officially, the Council was an 
organ of the British government.  Its members received a salary in addition to ncome derived 
from the awqaf.
152
  This revenue stream significantly bolstered its influence in Palestine.
153
  
However, the Council saw itself as the organ of an independent Arab government.
154
  The 
creation of the Council has been described as an “attempt to tame Palestinian [Arab] wrath” 
against the Balfour Declaration, and an “act of appeasement towards the Palestinian Muslims.”
155
  
Yet the creation of the Supreme Muslim Council should be seen primarily as an effort to 
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legitimize the British government by incorporating into it the Muslim power structure from 
Ottoman times.    
    Only a few days after becoming president of the Council, Haj Amin al-Husseini moved his 
offices from the British government building into the Haram ash-Sharif.
156
  This was a major 
turning point for Palestine’s Muslim community: now, for the first time, a coherent and 
autonomous Muslim regime held control over Palestine’s most important Muslim space.  The 
Haram gave this regime a territorial center, a source of legitimacy, and a means of mobilizing 
international Islamic solidarity.
157
  It was the only place in Palestine that Arabs could 
legitimately exclude Christians and Jews. “There is no doubt that the Haram al-Sharif was of 
major concern to the Supreme Muslim Council,” writes Uri Kupferschmidt, “at least throughout 
the 1920s.  It was not only a sanctuary of profound religious meaning and attachment, but also a 
focus and symbol of solidarity for all Palestinian Arabs.”
158
      
     That the Haram would play an important role in aspirations for Arab self-determination 
should have been evident from the beginning.  The Haram holds an esteemed place in Islamic 
tradition, and the Quran describes it as divinely blessed.
159
  One hadith explains that a prayer 
offered inside the Haram is worth five hundred prayers said anywhere else on earth.
160
   
According to tradition, Muhammad was praying in Mecca one day when Gabriel appeared to 
him leading a centaur-like creature called the Buraq.  Muhammad mounted this beast and soared 
across the desert to “the furthest mosque” (masjid al-aqsa), where he tethered the animal and 
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ascended the mountain of God.
161
  There, Muhammad led Moses, Jesus, and other saints in 
prayer.  Afterward he mounted the Buraq again and flew into heaven where he saw visions and 
learned how to pray from Allah.  As-Sakhra, the sacred rock inside the Haram, served as the 
original qibla or prayer direction for Muhammad’s followers.
162
   
     Besides its theological significance, the Haram was also important as a social and cultural 
center for local Muslims.  They viewed this holy site as their collective inheritance.
163
  Every 
year tens of thousands of Muslims converged on the Haram to make the Nebi Musa pilgrimage. 
Villagers living near Jerusalem came every Friday to attend prayers, hear sermons, and shop in 
nearby markets.
164
  Muslims who lived inside Jerusalem came to the Haram even more 
frequently, using it as an administrative space, public park, and place of worship by turn.
165
  
Colonel Storrs described it as the Arabs’ “favourite playground.”
166
  The Haram was also a place 
of pan-Islamic cultural interchange, since Muslims on hajj often visited it before returning home.  
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This social and cultural dimension of the Haram is rarely examined, but is important to 
understand its place in Mandate society.
167
  
     Ron E. Hassner has attempted to define the latent power of sacred space.  Sacred space, he 
says, provides access, legitimacy, meaning, and a sense of community for the religious 
communities who claim them.  It provides a location where worshippers can access the divine 
and make rules to prevent desecration of divine authority.
168
  Sacred space also provides the 
visible essence of their faith—the tangible expression of their religious and national identity.  
Hassner notes the unique social function that these spaces can play.  “Believers are drawn to 
sacred places not only because of the religious functions these sites perform but also because 
these places perform specific social roles.  In their function as legal, political, or financial 
centers, sacred places draw powerful actors from all walks of life into their orbit.”
169
   
     Hassner’s observation is relevant for understanding the Haram.  This sacred space provided 
access to the divine for believers—a fact perennially underappreciated by scholars.  The Haram 
likewise conferred legitimacy on the indigenous Arab leaders who controlled it, ensuring their 
continued hegemony within the Arab community.  The physical restoration of the Haram 
throughout the 1920s suggests tacit recognition by the Supreme Muslim Council of the site’s 
legitimizing power.
170
  The Haram provided meaning for Muslims in its embodiment of what it 
meant to be an authentic “Palestinian.”  It also empowered communal life by providing an 
autonomous space where Muslims could conduct their affairs independently of foreign intrusion. 
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     Rasseem Khamaisi has also examined the power of holy places in local society.   “[H]oly 
places form and represent community symbols,” he writes, “existing within a landscape and 
wielding power and spatial and resource control.”  The fundamental power of such a space 
derives from its rootedness in national and religious identities.  “Every community has its own 
narrative and memories related to holy sites, to which the members of that community feel that 
they belong.  When they gain power, they try to take control and dominate the holy place and the 
surrounding territory, including the city where the holy place exists.”  Religious groups find in 
sacred spaces more than just ritual “workspaces” or political talking points.  As Khamaisi writes, 
“They provide a center for our identity and offer us a place in which, momentarily transcending 
our usual selves, we merge with the past, with future and with eternal being.”
171
  
     In a Michigan Law Review article entitled “Law’s Territory: A History of Jurisdiction,” 
Richard T. Ford explored the conceptual nature of jurisdiction, that peculiar power framework 
that he argues grew out of the modern science of cartography.
172
  The notion of fixed legal 
boundaries, derived from Western European law, and the creation of “synthetic” regimes 
displaced many “organic” jurisdictions already in existence around the world.  Organic legal 
systems, Ford reminds us, often survive and compete with the authority of the former.  “Organic 
jurisdictions appear as matters of right,” he explains, “and are defended against attack in terms of 
autonomy, self-determination and cultural preservation.”  Ford’s observation sheds light on the 
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confrontation between the “synthetic” British government and the “organic” Muslim regime that 
survived from the Ottoman period and claimed sovereignty over Palestine from its citadel in the 
Haram.   
 
B. Israel’s Last Remaining Relic 
     If Muslims felt pride when they gazed at the Temple Mount, Jews felt profound loss.
173
  Two 
millennia before, the Mount had belonged to them and had served as the center of their religious 
and political life.  Jewish tradition portrayed the site as the cosmological nexus of space and 
time.
174
  Most importantly, it was the place where God’s presence, or shekhinah, dwelled on 
earth.
175
  Rabbinical tradition held that the ancient stone in the center of the Mount was the 
foundation stone upon which the world had been created.
176
  This stone reappeared throughout 
the history of Israel, beginning with the story of creation.
177
  Here Adam had been formed from 
dust, Noah had offered his sacrifice after the flood, and Abraham had laid his son Isaac for 
sacrifice.  According to the rabbis, Abraham had seen Solomon’s Temple in a prophetic 
vision.
178
  Almost a thousand years later, David bought the hilltop from a Canaanite named 
Ornah and made it the center of his kingdom.  His son Solomon constructed a large temple there 
for the offering of sacrifices to Yahweh.  For a brief period, the Temple Mount stood at the 
center of a thriving and powerful state of Israel 
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     But the political glory of Israel was not to last.  Soon after Solomon’s death the polity split 
into two competing kingdoms—Israel and Judah—and a few centuries later the Babylonian King 
Nebuchadnezzar captured Jerusalem and burned the Temple to the ground.  Some “Jews” (exiled 
citizens of the Kingdom of Judah) later returned from captivity in Babylon to rebuild the Temple 
and restore the sacrifices.  However, the Roman general Titus took the city a few centuries later 
and sacked the Temple again.  This time the destruction was complete.
179
  Titus’s victory, 
followed by Emperor Hadrian’s crushing of a Jewish revolt a generation later, marked a 
cataclysmic moment in Jewish history—the beginning of “exile.”  This exile was both physical 
separation from the Land of Israel and a loss of favor in the eyes of God.  Certainly the most 
devastating fact was the separation from the Temple Mount and its sacrifices which, until then, 
had formed the essence of Hebrew religion.  Judaism, if it may be called such at this point, had 
mainly been a priest- and blood sacrifice-centered faith.  After the exile, it became a religion of 
prayer, study, and observance of Jewish law.   
     Physical separation from the Temple Mount was not total, however.  Although Jewish 
religious authorities forbid entrance to the site until the time of Messiah, Jews continued to visit 
its western retaining wall to pray and lament the loss of the Temple.  They believed that the 
divine presence still lived inside the Mount, and cried to him through the holes in the Western 
Wall.
180
  The Jews who arrived in Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
never dreamed of unseating Muslim hegemony on the Mount.  Instead, both secular and religious 
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Zionists looked to the Western Wall as the last remaining relic of Israel’s ancient glory and the 
cornerstone of its modern rebirth.
181
   
     Despite its later infamy in Mandate history, the Western Wall was little more than a narrow 
alley wedged between the exterior wall of the Haram and a row of ramshackle stone hovels.  
Roughly thirty meters long and four meters wide, the alley was barely wide enough for several 
people to walk abreast.  The place was filthy by all accounts and lined with beggars.  Light was 
poor and heat was high.  On holy days the space was packed with Jews standing shoulder to 
shoulder in prayer.  Towering above them loomed the immense façade of the Haram ash-Sharif, 
and to their left loomed the Mahkama building that protruded outward from the Haram and 
housed the Sharia Court of Appeal.  There, and from other perches on the walls, Muslims often 
stood and watched the seething mass of Jews below for any sign of impropriety.     
      Many progressive Jews found the behavior of co-religionists at the Western Wall pathetic.
182
  
Norman Bentwich, British Jew and Attorney General during the first half of the Mandate, was 
uncomfortable with “[m]en and women mourn[ing] apart in little groups, resting their sacred 
books against the mighty wall that towers above to exclude them from the Temple Area; tears 
run[ning] freely down the wrinkled faces of aged men and women, some of whom rock 
themselves to and fro in their emotion.”
183
  However, even secular Jews like Bentwich 
recognized the significance of the place for Jewish identity.
184
  Itamar Ben-Avi, editor of Doar 
Ha-Yom, wrote a front page editorial in 1920 illustrating the secular view of the site.  Though 
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irreligious, Ben-Avi still viewed the Wall as a major factor in the Jewish renaissance.  He 
excoriated the despicable condition of the alley and rebuked fellow Jews for being passive about 
preserving it.  Its condition was directly indicative of the depressed condition of the nation.  
“New” Jews, brimming with the spirit of the Maccabees, needed to take this site and make it the 
center of Jewish national life.  “The Western Wall is our heart,” wrote Ben-Avi, “—it’s the same 
whether or not we’re religious, Sephardi or Ashkenazi, believers or free-thinkers.  The Western 
Wall is the heart of all Jewry, from Jerusalem to Vilna, and from New York to Australia.”
185
  
The symbolic power of the Wall in both secular and religious Jewish discourse echoed 
throughout the Hebrew literary world.
186
   
     But the Jews did not own the Western Wall.  Legally, it was the absolute property of the 
Muslim community: the Wall itself was part of the Haram, and the alley was part of an ancient 
waqf dedicated to North African Muslims.
187
  Islamic tradition venerated the site as the place 
where Muhammad had tethered his Buraq before ascending into heaven.  Under the Ottomans, 
Muslim ownership was rigidly enforced.  In 1840, government officials had denied a Jewish 
request to pave the alley since it was waqf property and connected to the Haram.  Jews were 
forbidden to even raise their voices or display their sacred books before the Wall.
188
  In late 
1911, the trustee of the waqf appealed to the Ottoman government to stop elderly Jews from 
bringing benches to the Wall.  The concern was that it would establish a precedent that later 
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generations might imply as a sign of ownership.
189
  Similar disputes occurred in 1912 and 
1914.
190
  These events show that Muslim attempts to restrict Jewish access to the site had been 
occurring long before the Balfour Declaration. 
     Zionists had special hopes for the Western Wall, seeing it as a natural starting point for 
creating a Jewish national home in Palestine.  Within only a few months of the Balfour 
Declaration, Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist movement, wrote to British diplomat 
William Ormsby-Gore proposing a conveyance of the Western Wall to the Jews for fair market 
value.  The Wall presently was “surrounded by ill-kept, ramshackle buildings” and had become 
“the haunt of Arab loafers and vagrants.”  Jews seeing it for the first time often found the sight 
“painful beyond description.”  Weizman explained that, “The dignity and solemnity which 
should attach to this monument of the ancient glories of Israel are obscured by a scene which 
speaks only of humiliation and degradation.”  He was very candid about his objective: “We feel 
that the present time, when Jewry is looking forward to a revival of its national life, would be of 
all times the most fitting for the carrying out of this project.”
191
  Weizmann knew that by 
acquiring the Western Wall he might be able to draw the ultra-Orthodox into the Zionist fold.
192
  
He forecasted the effect of purchasing the Wall as “an enterprise whose success would [be] so 
dramatic as to exalt the horn of Zionism with joy and honour throughout the world.”
193
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     Colonel Storrs recognized the value of Weizmann’s idea and attempted to mediate a deal with 
the waqf.  He relented, however, when the city’s Arabs heard about it and demanded an 
explanation.  Weizmann circumvented Storrs and requested permission from Lord Balfour to 
approach the waqf directly.  “[T]he satisfactory settling of this point would mean an enormous 
access of prestige to us,” Weizmann reminded Balfour.  “It would make the Jewish world fully 
realize what the British regime in Palestine means; it would help to rally all the Jews, especially 
the great masses of orthodox Jewry in Russia, Galicia and Roumania, as well as England, 
Germany and America round the platform which we have created, namely a Jewish Palestine 
under British auspices.”
194
  However, Balfour withheld permission and the deal died before birth. 
     Many Zionists accused Storrs of personally causing the negotiations to fail.
195
  Unfortunately, 
the negotiations were oral and no minutes remain.  Some scholars, Tom Segev among them, 
doubt that the Jews could have ever purchased the courtyard from the Muslims.
196
  However, the 
conveyance (or at least long-term rental) of waqfs to non-Muslims was not unprecedented.
197
  At 
any rate, Storrs lamented in later life that the deal had not been made.  In his view, the deal 
would have “obviated years of wretched humiliations, including the befouling of the Wall and 
pavement and the unmannerly braying of the tragi-comic Arab band during Jewish prayer and 
culminating in the horrible outrages of 1929.”
198
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     For Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem, the Western Wall courtyard would remain a perennial 
source of anxiety.
199
  Once the status quo was made law, Storrs’s job was to determine what the 
status quo at the Wall actually was.  The most pressing issue involved, of all things, wooden 
benches.    Elderly and infirm Jews who came to the Wall often brought these benches to sit on 
during long hours of prayer.  Muslims alleged that the benches established a precedent for 
unlawful Jewish rights in the alley.  Storrs combed through Ottoman records to determine what 
rights the Jews actually had been granted.  Muslim authorities provided him with several rulings 
against bringing benches to the Wall.  However, it was known that Muslims often entered into 
practical arrangements allowing Jews to bring these items anyway.  Storrs eventually decided 
that the benches were illegal and that Jews only had a right of way at the Wall.  They had the 
right to visit, but no more than anyone else.
200
  Storrs tried to persuade the Muslims to allow the 
benches on humanitarian grounds but they refused.
201
  As he explained, “[I]n Jerusalem…any 
concession or abrogation of existing rights tended to become the thin edge of the wedge before 
which other rights were apt to disintegrate.”
202
        
     It should be noted that Arab fears of intrusion on the Haram was not directed only at Jews.  
One incident in 1911 illustrates this point.  At that time, Muslim notables and peasants had 
rallied against the Ottoman government when they learned that British adventurer Montague 
Parker was exploring tunnels beneath the Haram for lost treasure.  Parker had bribed the Turkish 
governor and the sheikh of al-Aqsa to allow him to conduct excavations below the sacred rock.  
Unfortunately for Parker, an off-duty employee decided to spend the night in the Haram and 
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discovered Parker’s men hacking away under the holy shrine.  When word got out, a violent mob 
took to the streets demanding blood.
203
  Parker made his escape, but barely.
204
  Louis Fishman, 
who has investigated the incident, believes that the incident reveals an emerging Palestinian 
nationalism directly connected to possession of the Haram.
205
  I would add that it demonstrates 
that Jerusalem’s Muslims were prepared to protect the Haram against any foreign invasion, 
regardless of the invader’s ethnicity or religion.    
     The Arab riots of 1920 suggested to Jews that they could not rely upon the British for 
protection.  A few weeks after the riots, Jews gathered at the Western Wall to remember the 
victims.  They blew the shofar at a nearby synagogue and proclaimed a new era in Jewish 
history.
206
  Their fury with Arab impunity was exacerbated when, only a few weeks later, the 
waqf began making repairs to the upper portions of the Western Wall.
207
  The Jews saw this act 
as a flagrant violation of the status quo, and the Zionist Commission duly protested to the 
government:  
The Wailing Wall is the western wall of our temple, and has stood since the destruction 
of the Temple.  This Wall is regarded as their holiest possession by fifteen million Jews 
throughout the world.  They have not forgotten it for one moment ever since the 
Dispersion.  Before the stones of the Wailing Wall the Jewish people pour out their heart 
to God.  After the occupation of Jerusalem by the British armies, the Commander-in-
Chief promised, in the name of the British Government, to protect the Holy Places, 
without outside interference.  And now the Wailing Wall, the Holy of Holies of the 
Jewish people, is being repaired without ever the opinion of the local Hebrew community 
having been asked.  A sacrilege has been committed, both in the religious and the 
historical sense.  If there is any real danger of the falling of the uppermost courses of the 
Wall, the local Hebrew community should have been informed, when the necessary steps 
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to repair the Wall would have been taken.  We beg even to doubt the reality of any such 
danger.  Why has this danger become so suddenly apparent—just at a moment when the 
minds of the inhabitants are disturbed by political events?  Was there a need for these 
repairs to proceed on Saturday—when hundreds of Jews stand in prayer near the Wall?  
Are the religious feelings of the Jews entitled no consideration whatsoever? 
     I most emphatically request that an order be given to stop the repairs.  If an 
architectural survey shows that there is any immediate danger and that it is necessary to 
repair the upper courses of stones, let the work of reparation be entrusted to the Jewish 
community of Jerusalem. 
 
     Storrs viewed Muslim repairs to the Wall, while legal, as a “piece of unwarrantable and 
calculated bad manners.”
208
  C.R. Ashbee, his civic architect, stated that the repairs were 
necessary but noted that the Muslims were being intentionally provocative.  “To the devout 
Moslem mason perched on the eyrie of his scaffolding eighty feet up in the sky the temptation of 
dropping a gobbet of wet mortar upon the furry hat of the idolatrous Israelite beneath…was a 
severe one.”
209
   Ashbee advised Storrs that the repairs were not so needed as to require work 
during Jewish prayer.  The government decided that repairs to the upper parts of the Wall could 
be done by the waqf (outside traditional Jewish prayer times), but that repair to the lower 
courses—where the Jews stood—could only be done by the Department of Antiquities.  This 
limitation on Muslim authority provoked sharp protest from the Mufti.
210
  Despite the subject 
matter, however, Storrs saw this incident as “religious hardly even in name.”
211
   
 
C. The Sacred and the Violent 
     The conflict at the borderland of the Temple Mount grew more explosive as the Mandate 
progressed.  In March 1925, Arabs protested Lord Balfour’s visit to Jerusalem by barricading the 
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entrances to the Haram.
212
  For the first time, Christians were admitted inside and allowed to 
make speeches against Zionism and the British regime.
213
  On September 28, 1925, Jews brought 
benches to the Wall for the observance of Yom Kippur.  Muslims immediately complained to the 
government, and Storrs ordered police to remove the benches.  The Zionist Commission 
complained that the government should have notified the Jews that it was planning to enforce the 
law on the books.  Worshippers would have then been prepared and have remained undisturbed 
in their devotions.  Storrs contended that the Jews had been given notice, and that police action 
was the only remedy for violation of the status quo.  He hoped that Jewish and Muslim religious 
leaders would sort out the dispute for themselves, and tried to convince the waqf to build stone 
benches in the courtyard to obviate the need for the Jews to bring portable ones.
214
  
     The Hebrew newspaper Ha-Poel Ha-Tzair published an editorial soon afterward decrying the 
police action and blasting the government’s “no benches” policy as arbitrary and ridiculous.  
“Laws certainly have to be observed,” the author wrote.  “But one also needs to know how to 
implement laws in a humane manner.”  The author placed most of the blame on Storrs, and 
called him an anti-Semite and hater of Israel.
215
  A similar editorial in Davar pointed out the 
perceived legal inconsistencies under the Mandate: “According to the law it is permitted to bring 
defecating donkeys near the Wall in front of Jews who pray there.  But it is forbidden to bring 
stools…what a sacred law!”
216
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     For Arab Muslims, benches were symbolic of growing Jewish power in Palestine.  Although 
this power had been steadily growing since the mid-nineteenth century, the burgeoning presence 
at the gates of the Haram provoked an especially visceral response.  Muslims turned to 
expressions of physical dominance to assert their authority over the site.  Some led their donkeys 
through the courtyard to disrupt Jewish worship.
217
  In October 1926, one group pelted a crowd 
of praying Jews with rocks.
218
   In July of the following year, a mob attacked and severely beat a 
Jew walking alone near the Wall.
219
  Weizmann wrote to Lord Plumer asking Britain to find 
some way to stop the Arabs from interfering with Jewish worship.
220
  On June 22, the Permanent 
Mandates Commission of the League of Nations discussed the problem, but abstained from 
making a decision since the matter could only be solved by direct negotiations between Muslims 
and Jews.  The mandatory government was ordered to effect these negotiations.
221
   
     Frustrated by ongoing harassment, Jews petitioned the government to prohibit sightseers from 
gathering near the Western Wall during Sabbath prayers.
222
   The Mufti protested immediately, 
claiming that such a concession would amount to granting the Jews new rights at the Buraq—an 
innovation contrary to the status quo, and sure to provoke anger among Muslims.  The true 
owners of the site were the North African Arabs who lived there on behalf of the waqf.  Maybe 
these Arabs liked sightseers in their neighborhood, in which case it would be unlawful to deprive 
them of their property rights.  Prohibiting sightseers from visiting the Buraq during Jewish 
prayer would only advance the long-term conspiracy to commandeer the site from the Arabs. 
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     Rumors circulated in Jerusalem that the government planned to expropriate the waqf for 
public health reasons and give it to the Jews.  The Supreme Muslim Council reacted by 
commencing several building projects in 1928.  One of these was a small zawiyah, or prayer 
niche, at the southern end of the Wall courtyard.
223
  Another was an iron door in the same area 
that would directly link the courtyard with the inside of the Haram.  The Mufti later admitted that 
during this time the Jews were secretly trying to bribe him.  They allegedly offered to pay him 
50,000 pounds personally in addition to the cost of the courtyard and payoffs to other members 
of the Supreme Muslim Council.  The total payment would have totaled nearly 400,000 pounds.  
However, the Mufti refused this offer and ordered his men to continue building.  His goal was to 
obviate any need for the government to seize the courtyard for health reasons by beautifying the 
space and emphasizing its Muslim character.
224
 
     Throughout this period the Haram was undergoing extensive renovations.
225
  Under the 
direction of Colonel Storrs at the beginning of British rule, the Pro-Jerusalem Society had 
advanced the waqf several hundred pounds to begin restoring the Dome of the Rock.
226
  When 
the waqf’s income finally stabilized, it repaid the Pro-Jerusalem Society and put an additional 
700 pounds toward the work.
227
  A gift of 25,000 pounds from a Muslim donor in 1924 ensured 
completion of renovations to both the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque.
228
  In the end, the 
renovations cost over 60,000 pounds.
229
   On August 28, 1928, the birthday of Muhammad, the 
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Mufti unveiled the newly-renovated Haram before a vast crowd of British and Arab dignitaries.  
Some scholars have suggested that the completion of this restoration inspired an upwelling of 
Islamic pride and intensified calls for Arab sovereignty in Palestine.
230
 
     The Yom Kippur holiday of 1928 marked a watershed in Mandate history.  On the evening of 
September 23, the new British governor of Jerusalem Edward Keith-Roach visited the Mahkama 
building overlooking the Western Wall courtyard.  Looking down, he noticed a prayer divider, or 
mechitza, separating Jewish men and women not unlike in an Orthodox synagogue.  Keith-Roach 
ordered the Jewish beadle, or shammash, to take down the divider as an infringement of the 
status quo, and instructed the police that if the divider was still up in the morning to take it down 
by force.  With the dawn of Yom Kippur—Judaism’s most solemn day—police officers noticed 
that it was still up.  They stormed the courtyard, pushed aside protesting Jews, and seized the 
divider, hauling away an old rabbi when he refused to let go of it.
231
  
     The Jewish outcry was instant and loud.  The British had violated the sanctity of Judaism’s 
holiest place on Judaism’s holiest day.  The Zionist Commission bypassed the government and 
appealed directly to the League of Nations.  The Chief Rabbinate declared a fast across Palestine.  
Jewish mystics devoted themselves to meditation on Psalm 79 which began, “O God, the heathen 
are come into thine inheritance; thy holy temple have they defiled; they have laid Jerusalem on 
heaps.”
232
  Vehement personal attacks were launched against Edward Keith-Roach, but he 
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dismissed them as “far more political than pious.”
233
  Devout Jews, he believed, had little interest 
in the episode.
234
   
     The Colonial Office was quick to defend Keith-Roach’s decision.  In an official statement, it 
insisted that the use of force had been lawful and that the calamity had been caused by the Jewish 
violation of the status quo.  Such violations required immediate action.
235
  “The use of the 
divider and its attachment to the pavement constituted an infraction of the status quo which the 
Government was unable to ignore,” the Colonial Office stated.  At the same time, it “deplored’ 
the shock caused to large numbers of Jews on a day so holy.
236
  Keith-Roach himself was not 
sorry.  “Justice had been done,” he wrote later.  “The status quo had been preserved with as little 
force as possible.”
237
  
     New rumors began to spread that the British were planning to permanently station a Jewish 
police officer inside the courtyard to avoid such incidents in the future.  The rumor added fuel to 
what was already a simmering Arab fire.  The Supreme Muslim Council submitted a memo to 
the government accusing the Jews of trying to seize the Haram complex and claiming that this 
new policy would only further their goals.  The Council denounced any further concessions to 
the Jews since the site was “a purely Moslem place.”
238
  The Mufti addressed a personal letter to 
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the king of England asking him, as the ruler of Christian world, to protect the holy places as 
Caliph Omar had done when he was ruler of Jerusalem.
239
 
     A new group headed by the Mufti, calling itself the “Defence Committee of the Noble 
Buraq,” issued a fiery pamphlet against Jewish aggression at the site.  The audience for the 
pamphlet included Muslims both in Palestine and abroad.  It decried the “danger which 
surrounds the [Aqsa] Mosque through the designs of the Jews to wrench it from the hands of 
Moslems”—designs that were “clearly shown” by recent Jewish behavior.  The Buraq was just 
as holy as the Haram and formed an inseparable part of the larger complex.  Furthermore, the 
Buraq was waqf property and thus inviolate under Mandate law.  “The purpose of the Jews in 
acquiring these Wakfs is the erection of a Synagogue in the place thereof which will be higher 
than the wall of the Mosque and will base itself thereon when it will be easier for them to 
penetrate into the Aqsa Mosque by various means.”
240
  Muslims had to resist this aggression and 
make “their sacred right a lawful weapon for the defence of their religious places.”  The 
Committee called upon all Muslims to act since the Haram was their shared heritage. “Let them 
make of their forces one force which shall guard the houses of Allah, and of their voices one 
voice which shall ring in every space and be heard by every ear.”
241
   
     On November 1, 1928, the Mufti hosted a conference of Arab notables including delegations 
from Transjordan, Damascus, and Beirut.  The congress emphasized Muslim authority over the 
Haram and the Buraq, and resolved to fight Jewish infiltration by appealing to the Muslim world 
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and the League of Nations.
242
  In the meantime, they held the British government responsible for 
any violence that resulted from Muslims defending their heritage.  They pointed to the 1924 
Expropriation Ordinance as proof that the government, manipulated by its Jewish Attorney 
General Norman Bentwich, was planning to expropriate all waqfs and Islamic holy sites for 
transfer to the Jews.
243
  The congress demanded a promise that this ordinance would not be used 
for such a scheme.  A waqf could only be exchanged for another waqf, and then only by power of 
an Islamic court.
244
   The Mufti and several prominent sheikhs visited the Buraq right after the 
congress and conducted an impromptu religious service in which a muezzin called the faithful to 
prayer from a nearby rooftop.  One Hebrew newspaper described this demonstration of Muslim 
authority under the headline, “First Step Toward a Mosque of the Western Wall?”
245
   
     Frustrated by persistent rumors that Jews wanted to seize the Temple Mount, the Jewish 
National Assembly published an open letter to the Muslim community, stating: “We herewith 
declare emphatically and sincerely that no Jew has ever thought of encroaching upon the rights 
of Moslems over their own Holy Places, but our Arab brethren should also recognize the rights 
of Jews in regard to the places in Palestine which are holy to them.”  The National Assembly 
called on Arab leaders to dispel the rumors about Jews trying to infiltrate the Haram.  They also 
reminded the Arabs that Jews would not concede their rights at the Wall but would view 
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opposition to this right as a serious offense.
246
  In the meantime, a group of concerned Jews 
created their own “Pro-Wailing Wall Committee” to defend their rights at the site.
247
 
     In late December the Mufti wrote to Keith-Roach and called upon him to halt Jewish 
innovation at the Wall.  The Mufti sent two more letters in early 1929 repeating his request.
248
  
High Commissioner John Chancellor met with him and asked him to halt construction at the 
Wall until he received guidance from London on whether it was allowed.  After some prodding, 
the Mufti agreed.  Chancellor then pushed his idea of selling special licenses to Jews that would 
allow them to bring benches to the Wall.  That way, Chancellor suggested naively, everyone 
would win.  Needless to say, the Mufti was not interested in the idea.
249
  The Muslim community 
was geared for resisting threats to its autonomy, not compromising with the Jews.  
     A few days later the Chief Rabbinate, the Jewish National Assembly, and the anti-Zionist 
Agudat Israel sent a joint letter to the British government complaining that Arabs were trying to 
provoke the Jews at their holy site.  Concerning the zawiyah, the letter stated, “It is obviously 
difficult to imagine that a new religious need has arisen now after hundreds of years, and that it 
is this need which has prompted them to erect an additional small Mosque beside the famous 
larger Mosque.”
250
  Jewish anger intensified with the commencement of a new zikr ceremony in 
the southern end of the courtyard.  This raucous ritual involved groups of Muslims chanting and 
clanging cymbals to achieve a mystical state of devotion.  For Jews praying just a few meters 
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away, it was a blatant violation of the status quo and an offense to the site’s sanctity.  The Mufti 
meanwhile moved into to a house overlooking the courtyard to watch what the Jews would do.
251
 
     In mid-June, the Law Officers of the Crown ruled that the Supreme Muslim Council could 
resume its building operations.  Interim-High Commissioner Harry Luke sent a letter to the 
Supreme Muslim Council informing them of the ruling.  However, Luke explained, the ruling 
had been granted on several conditions: one, the erection of the zawiyah and the door could not 
interfere with Jewish worship; two, the observance of Muslim rituals should not take place in the 
presence of Jewish worshippers; three, Muslims could not pass through the door during times of 
Jewish prayer.
252
  Luke also wrote to the Zionist Executive notifying them of the decision, 
assuring them that a final determination of the status quo had yet to be made.
253
 
     A few weeks later, the new door was opened in the southern end of the Western Wall 
courtyard linking it to the interior of the Haram.  Foot and animal traffic in the narrow space 
immediately increased, and it effectively became an extension of Muslim authority outside the 
walls of the Haram.  During the next few months the alley became the stage for daily verbal and 
physical altercations between Jews and Muslims which, unfortunately, are largely 
undocumented.  Needless to say, Muslims grew continually bolder in their provocations and 
Jews grew continually angrier at the invasion of their holy place.  Chief Rabbi Kook said, “[T]his 
place, which from early times had been an intimate place for the concentration and deep feelings 
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of the Jewish heart, has been turned into a highway, open to every passer by[.]”
254
  Luke would 
later argue that the new door was actually beneficial for the Jews in that it allowed Muslims to 
reach the zawiyah at the southern end of the allety without forcing them to cross the Wall 
pavement.
255
  However, Luke also recognized that all Muslim activity in the courtyard—the 
door, the zawiyah, the zikr, and the call to prayer—was all intended to assert their sovereignty 
over the site.
256
  For their part, the Jews wanted more than just access to the Western Wall: they 
also wanted the right to congregational worship and the recognition of the site as effective 
Jewish property.
257
 
     The atmosphere in Jerusalem was tense, and the Jewish and Arab communities were growing 
more restless.  The British police monitored both communities closely.  On the Ninth of Av, the 
traditional day of Jewish mourning for the Temple, a Jewish police officer slipped into 
Jerusalem’s Yeshurun Synagogue to observe the crowd.  After several speeches on defending the 
Western Wall, he noted that “feeling amongst the congregation was running very high.”  At the 
Wall itself, worshippers packed the courtyard and effectively blocked any lateral movement.  
Muslims pedestrians nevertheless forced their way through this crowd and berated those Jews 
who confronted them. 
     The next day a number of Jewish young men assembled to march to the Wall as a 
demonstration of Jewish authority at the site.  Most belonged to both the Pro-Wailing Wall 
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Committee and the Revisionist Zionist Alliance of Vladimir Jabotinsky.
258
  A spokesman for the 
group stated that they were officially protesting the government’s failure to protect Jewish rights 
at the Wall.  Several hundred “excited and hot-headed young men” marched to the Wall, raised 
the Zionist flag, and sang the Zionist anthem.  Their leaders read several resolutions and ordered 
two minutes of silence.  Then they exited the Old City, shouting “The Wall is ours!,” “Shame on 
those who profane the holy places,” and “Shame on the government.”
259
  Despite the ferocity of 
their words, police at the scene reported that the group was on the whole “quite well behaved.”
260
  
The Mufti watched the entire event from his window.
261
 
     The next day police met with members of the Arabic press to defuse the expected gush of 
Arab anger.  Arabs indeed flocked to the Wall that evening as “spectators” hoping to stir Jewish 
passions.  Men and boys filled the windows of the Mahkama building and shouted at the Jews 
below.  Police officers observing the event described the Arab crowds as “a menace to peace.”  
On Friday August 16, a large group of Muslim men flooded out of al-Aqsa Mosque after midday 
prayers and proceeded en masse to the Buraq.  There, they shattered Jewish instruments and 
burned prayer books.
262
  A few days later, several Arabs stabbed a Jew to death in a tomato patch 
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near a soccer field.
263
  The next day, a group of Jews attacked Arabs passing through the Jewish 
quarter.
264
  Palestine stood on the brink of anarchy, but the British government seemed helpless 
to quell it. 
     The following Saturday morning, Jewish worshippers came to the Wall to worship.  Arabs 
again began to walk through the courtyard to demonstrate their authority over the space.  Later, 
Arabs attacked a group of Jews in the Bukharan Quarter of the city.
265
  The following Friday, 
August 23, Muslims from around Palestine converged on Jerusalem for midday prayers 
brandishing sticks and knives.  The Mufti arranged for Imam Sa’ad ad-Din to preach to a 
massive crowd gathered inside al-Aqsa Mosque.  Sa’ad ad-Din unsheathed a large sword and 
launched into a fiery sermon: 
If we give way an inch to the Jews in regard to their demands at the Wailing Wall, they 
will ask for the Mosque of Aqsa; if we give them the Mosque of al-Aqsa, they will 
demand the Dome of the Rock; if we give them the Dome of the Rock they will demand 
the whole of Palestine, and having gained the whole of Palestine they will proceed to turn 
us Arabs out of our country.  I ask you now to take the oath of God the Great to swear by 
your right hand that you will not hesitate to act when called upon to do so, and that you 
will, if need be, fight for the Faith and the Holy Places to the death. 
 
     The crowd became hysteric, and Sa’ad ad-Din seized on their emotion: “[G]o,” he told them, 
“pounce upon your enemies and kill that you in doing so may obtain Paradise.”  A vast crowd 
surged out of the Haram shouting, “The country is our country and the Jews are our dogs,” and 
“The religion of Mohammed came with the sword.”
266
   The crowd fell upon Jews wherever they 
could be found, killing and maiming without distinction.  The violence spread quickly to other 
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parts of Palestine, and the government stood overwhelmed and powerless.  There were only 175 
British officers and 1500 policemen in the entire country, most of the latter being either Arab or 
Jewish.  In Hebron, Arabs massacred almost seventy Jews.
267
  In Safed, they killed almost 
twenty.  In the end, almost three hundred people were killed.  It took five warships, three infantry 
battalions, several squadrons of armored cars, and a squadron of RAF airplanes to regain 
order.
268
  In the end, 133 Jews lay dead and 198 wounded.   
     The British were shocked at the display of barbarity.   Indictments were brought against those 
who were directly responsible.  Almost a thousand Arabs were charged and sentenced, and 
seventeen capital sentences were handed down.
269
  The government imposed collective fines on 
towns and villages that condoned the riots, and requested 100 new recruits for Palestine’s police 
force.  High Commissioner Chancellor cabled London reporting that the conflict at the Wall was 
ultimately “irreconcilable” through legislation or executive order.  He called for the immediate 
establishment of the Holy Places Commission described in Article 14 of the Mandate, feeling 
that no other judicial body had the authority and credibility to deal with the issue. 
270
  The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies responded by appointing a British commission to investigate 
the immediate causes of the riots, and called upon the League to establish the Holy Places 
Commission immediately.
271
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     Most of Palestine’s Arabs denied any responsibility for the violence.  One group of Muslim 
and Christian lawyers claimed that the Arabs were in fact the real victims of the episode.  Arab 
rioters had been “armed [only] with the weapon of Right and of the conviction that they 
defended the sanctities, their religious and political rights, their national dignity.”   Jewish crimes 
against the Arabs were much worse.
272
  A declaration from the Society for the Protection of the 
Mosque Al-Aqsa and the Moslem Holy Places similarly blamed the Jews for provoking the 
Muslims and causing the riots.
273
  The tension had not abated.  Secret shipments of arms were 
arriving from sympathizers abroad for both Arabs and Jews.  British intelligence uncovered the 
existence of an Arab assassination team known as the “Boycott Committee” created by members 
of the Supreme Muslim Council to kill Arabs acting against “Arab national interests.”
274
  Other 
private militias were being organized in Arab towns and villages to repel the Jews and rise up 
against the British.  The Arabs were in a “state of extreme excitement that approximated to a 
revolutionary disposition.”
275
  The Muslim regime in Jerusalem meanwhile felt untouchable, 
knowing that their vast constituency in Palestine would follow their lead and that Arab states 
outside would come to their defense.
276
  The High Commissioner begged the War Office to keep 
additional troops in Palestine despite financial worries, noting that money could not rank above 
protecting the Jews.
277
   
     The British government spent the following months in heated debate over how to fix 
Palestine.  The riots had proved that the current system  was unworkable.  The mixed Arab and 
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Jewish police force had to be scrapped since neither side could be relied upon in a crisis.  This 
force had been “practically valueless” during the riots—in the words of one official, a sword 
more likely to “pierce one’s own hand.”
278
  Subsequent investigations revealed British 
intelligence failures to be also responsible for the riots.
279
  The commission created to probe the 
immediate causes of the riots convened in Palestine in late October, headed by former colonial 
judge Sir Walter Shaw.
280
   The “Shaw Commission” had no authority to determine final rights at 
the Wall—these were to be left for the international Holy Places Commission that was still 
anticipated by many.
281
   
     Haj Amin al-Husseini was summoned before the tribunal to explain his role in the riots.  He 
denied any responsibility and likewise denied using waqf funds to bribe Arab journalists to write 
articles that fueled the riots.
282
  The pressure to revolt, he claimed, had come from the bottom 
up.
283
  He deflected questions about his application for visas from Turkey, Greece, Italy, 
Romania, and Syria before the riots.
284
  The British, he insisted, should take the entire blame.  
Their adherence to the Balfour Declaration, their failure to establish a national parliament, and 
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their refusal to honor the McMahon-Husseini agreements provided the fundamental causes for 
Palestine’s instability.
285
  
     Haj Amin emphasized the Muslim community’s autonomy and authority over its holy sites.  
As the sole owner of both of the Haram and the Buraq, Muslims had the power to exclude 
whomever they wished from these sites.  As leader of the Muslim community, Haj Amin—not 
the British government—exercised sole jurisdiction over the Haram.
286
  He also controlled the 
zawiyah, the waqf, the street connecting the Haram with the courtyard, and all the houses around 
it.
287
  This zone of religious authority, he argued, stood above the British government.  His vision 
of Muslim sovereignty was built on two ideological premises: first, the Haram as the nucleus of 
Palestine’s cosmic sanctity; and, secondly, the Haram as the cornerstone of Arab independence.  
The Haram was, true to its name, a place set apart for Allah and his worshippers.
288
  The Buraq, 
by its connection to the Haram, enjoyed the same sanctity.  Jewish aggression at the site had 
initiated a Muslim reaction only because the latter felt its sanctity had been violated.
289
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     Kupferschmidt claims that the Mufti’s interest in the Buraq was mere political opportunism.  
However, Kupferschmidt undermines his own argument by acknowledging that appeals for the 
defense of the Haram took place as early as 1922—long before the riots or any real indication of 
Jewish power at the Western Wall.  Kupferschmidt also notes that the Buraq was mentioned in 
the very first official statement of the Supreme Muslim Council, and that squabbles over the 
Wall had often taken place before 1928.
290
  Kupferschmidt attempts to dismiss these earlier 
events as “predominantly technical problem[s] of trespassing rights” without explaining the basis 
for this distinction.  He claims that Haj Amin was merely “playing up and misrepresenting 
utterances by Jewish personalities,” and that his religious rhetoric about defending the Haram 
from Jewish aggression was simply political propaganda.
291
  Kupferschmidt, like many scholars, 
relies on arbitrary distinctions between politics and religion.  I would argue that in the case of 
Mandate Palestine such distinctions are impossible to make.   
     I would also argue that the Mufti and the Muslim community genuinely believed that the Jews 
wanted to take the Haram.
292
  The findings of the Shaw Commission and statements of the then-
High Commissioner of Palestine seem to substantiate this argument.
293
  The Mufti described 
Muslim feeling before the riots as one of “grave anxiety” marked by a conviction that their “civil 
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and religious rights” were “in danger.”
294
  Muslims had seen pictures printed by Jews displaying 
the Zionist emblem emblazoned over the Haram.
295
  They had read the 1911 Encyclopedia 
Britannica article on “Zionism” that spoke of the movement’s desire to rebuild the Jewish 
temple.  They had read speeches in which prominent Zionists had openly declared their desire to 
possess the Mount and make it the center of the national home.  They noticed Jewish visitors at 
the Wall change from Orthodox old men to aggressive and secular youth.
296
  These trends 
convinced Arabs that the Zionists were planning to take the Haram.
297
  Years after the riots, Haj 
Amin remained convinced of this conspiracy.
298
  Whether the Zionists wanted to take the Haram 
immediately or some day in the future was irrelevant to him.  The Zionists planned to take all of 
Palestine because “the only place they would gather is round the Temple of Solomon….. Other 
countries richer than this country were offered to the Jews and they refused to take them, and the 
Jews fell upon Palestine because of the presence of this holy place in Palestine.”
299
  This 
statement was not as paranoid as it seems.  While most Zionists truthfully had no interest in 
possessing the Temple Mount, some did in fact wish to make it the center of Jewish national life. 
     The riots revealed the government’s inability to restrict Muslim autonomy in the Haram.   
Harry Luke, the interim High Commissioner, was called before the Shaw Commission and asked 
why he had not stopped Muslim rioters as they exited the Haram.  Luke denied his ability to do 
so, since it would have involved the use of force either inside the Haram or very close to it.  
Because there was an exceptionally large group of Muslims in Jerusalem that day, such an act 
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was sure to lead to “conflict and inevitable bloodshed.”  Of course, the effect on worldwide 
Muslim opinion was “impossible to forecast.”
300
  Luke insisted that his police could not have 
stopped the Muslims without putting themselves in danger and violating the sanctity of the 
Haram.  “[W]ell,” said Luke, “there was no knowing what the result or consequences of that 
might be.”
301
 
     The final report of the Shaw Commission suggested for the first time that the Balfour 
Declaration and Arab opposition to it were the fundamental causes of instability in Palestine.  
Although other factors had proximately caused the riots—most notably the Jewish demonstration 
at the Wall and the incendiary Arabic reaction—the wider clash between Jewish and Arab 
nationalism was underlying catalyst.  The British placed some of the blame on the League of 
Nations for delaying the establishment of the Holy Places Commission.  Early creation of this 
body would have obviated the chance that tensions at the site would have gotten so out of hand.  
League officials adamantly denied this charge, and one member on the Permanent Mandates 
Commission rebuked the British for airing inter-Christian quarrels.  “Was it giving a good 
example to Arabs and Jews in Palestine to allow them to witness the difficulties raised by 
Christian Powers in regard to the appointment of this Commission?” the official asked.
302
   
     In mid-1930, a bastardized version of the much-awaited Holy Places Commission convened 
in Palestine.   While international in character, this commission was not the same entity 
envisioned by Article 14.  Instead, this “International Commission for the Wailing Wall” was an 
ad hoc body tasked with determining rights at the Western Wall only.  Comprised of three 
judges, all of which were from Christian nations (Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands), the 
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commission’s legitimacy was suspect from the beginning.  Muslims denied that it had 
jurisdiction over the subject matter since only an Islamic court could rule on the status of a 
Muslim holy place.
303
  Nevertheless, the Supreme Muslim Council organized a legal team to 
argue its case before the commission, as did the Zionists.  The commission sat for a month and 
heard the testimony of fifty-two witnesses.  In the end, it ruled that the Muslims had absolute 
ownership of the site; the Jews had the right of access and worship established by ancient 
custom; the Jews were entitled to bring objects of worship to the Wall but not furniture; Muslims 
were prohibited from building during times of Jewish worship and from interfering with such 
worship; the Jews were prohibited from blowing the shofar; and political speechmaking of any 
kind was forbidden.
304
       
     The Wailing Wall riots marked a major turning point in the history of Palestine.
305
  They 
convinced the Jews that they alone were responsible for protecting themselves.  The British, 
despite their many promises, appeared either unwilling or unable to safeguard the Jewish 
national home.  The riots also catapulted the Arab Muslim regime inside the Haram to the peak 
of its power and influence.  Haj Amin al-Husseini emerged from the riots with little more than a 
slap on the wrist, and his popularity soared at home and abroad.  Yet a sizeable segment of the 
Muslim community in Palestine resented his authority and organized to oppose him.  The Mufti 
would not go quietly, however, and organized his ranks for battle.  Thus began a protracted gang 
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war between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, the two rivals for Arab power in Palestine.  Not 
long after the riots, the Mufti closed the Haram to non-Muslims and reinforced his control over 
the space.
306
  The final, tragic chapter of the Mandate had begun. 
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The land of Israel sits at the center of the world, Jerusalem at the center of the land of Israel, the 
Temple at the center of Jerusalem, the Holy Place at the center of the Temple, the Ark at the center of 
the Holy Place, and before the Ark the Foundation Stone from which the world was created.
307
 
 
 
V. FEAR OF THE SANCTUARY 
     The use of holy sites as sanctuaries from the law has not been given the attention it 
deserves.
308
  It has long been recognized that juridical authority can be limited by certain subject 
matter.  In the Anglo-American tradition, for example, issues of excessive political import are 
habitually dismissed by courts in deference to the political branches of government.  Religion, 
too, is often treated deferentially.  Holy sites are given especially wide berth by secular 
authorities hoping to avoid religious quarrels.  This abdication of secular power creates a zone of 
traditional authority that exists concurrently with, and sometimes in defiance of, the authority of 
the sovereign.  Physical autonomy inside holy sites, whether de jure or de facto, endows 
traditional leaders with religious legitimacy.  These leaders and their followers guard these sites 
jealously to preserve their authority against foreign intrusion.
309
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     This chapter examines the last segment of Mandate history and focuses on the Jewish 
perspective of the Temple Mount, both as a cornerstone for redemption and as an Arab refuge 
from colonial law.  Ultimately, I argue that the site’s exemption from British law simultaneously 
exacerbated the Arab revolt (1936-1939) and encouraged the rise of Jewish rebellion. 
 
A. Cornerstone for Redemption 
    Jewish history cannot be fully understood apart from the binary concept of exile/redemption.  
The idea of exile, or galut, is woven throughout Jewish history beginning with slavery in Egypt, 
moving through captivity in Assyria and Babylon, and culminating in the expulsion from 
Palestine by the Romans.  For almost two thousand years Jews saw themselves as a nation in 
exile, banished from their homeland on account of their sins.
310
  In exile they awaited 
redemption—a concept quite murky and contested by the various branches of the Jewish world.  
Orthodox Jews, the majority of world Jewry, had long believed that redemption would only 
come with Messiah.  Until then, they were content to wait patiently.  Zionists on the other hand 
viewed redemption as return to the land of Israel and a proactive revival of Jewish national life.  
Zionists were largely secular or non-observant, and even though influenced by ideas of 
exile/redemption they did not embrace the “passivity” of exile.   
     The idea of rebuilding the Jewish temple was a main tenet of traditional redemption.  Indeed, 
it had been the professed hope of Jews everywhere since the beginning of exile.  Three times a 
day for almost two thousand years, Jews had prayed, “Be favorable, oh Lord our God, to your 
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people Israel and their prayer, and restore the service of the Holy of Holies of Your House, and 
accept the fire-offerings of Israel and their prayer with love and favor.”  Maimonides, one of 
Judaism’s foremost philosophers, dedicated a significant amount of his Mishneh Torah to the 
expected resumption of Temple worship.
311
  In the late nineteenth century, Rabbi Zvi Hirsch 
Kalischer published a popular book called Drishat Zion in which he called for a corporate return 
to Jerusalem and the reinstitution of animal sacrifices.
312
  Most traditional Jews, however, 
remained convinced that the messianic age could not be hastened, and that Jews could not build 
the Temple without divine sanction.  In any event, it was obvious that the Temple Mount was 
occupied by the Muslims.    
     But this did not mean that Jews were uninterested in the Temple Mount.  In fact, most still 
looked upon it as their holiest site and awaited the day when it would become theirs alone.  
Zionism, a secular anomaly in Jewish history, had no interest in resuming the old sacrificial 
system.
313
  But even secular Zionists understood that rebuilding the Temple would prompt a 
quantum leap in Jewish evolution.
314
   Herzl himself had envisioned a third Temple in his 
utopian novel Old-New Land, but, true to his assimilated worldview, described it simply as a 
large synagogue constructed on some other hilltop in Jerusalem.  Religious Zionists meanwhile 
longed for the return of the Temple.  Rabbi Yitzhak ha-Cohen Kook, the father of Religious 
Zionism, said, “The Holy Sanctum is consecrated to Israel for ever, and it should in the end 
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revert to Israel and the Temple be rebuilt with great splendor, as promised by the Prophet 
Ezekiel.”
315
   
     During the proceedings of the Shaw Commission, Chief Rabbi Kook was asked his views on 
rebuilding the Jewish temple.   He explained to the panel that this was an otherworldly idea tied 
to the coming of Messiah.  Messiah, he said, would usher in the “final aim of redemption”: the 
building of the third Temple as a house of prayer for all nations.   In the meantime, it could never 
be built through human effort alone.  He explained to the commission the principle of Mora 
Mikdash.   This halakhic (Jewish religious-legal) principle demanded that Jews refrain from 
entering the Temple Mount for “fear of the Sanctuary” because they were in a ritually impure 
state.  Treading upon on the Holy of Holies in this state would transgress the site’s divine 
sanctity and call down a curse of death.
316
  “In accordance with the commands in the Torah,” 
Kook said, “we are not even allowed, until the day of redemption…to enter the area surrounding 
the Holy Temple[.]”
317
  On the other hand, he added dubiously, the Jews were under a command 
to settle and improve the land of their fathers.
318
 
     Motti Inbari claims that Kook saw rebuilding the Temple as a main objective of Zionism.  
National redemption could only occur when the ancient center of the nation was reactivated in 
the service of God.  There seems to be evidence to support Inbari’s assertion.  In 1921, only a 
few years after the Balfour Declaration, Kook founded Torat ha-Cohanim Yeshiva in the Muslim 
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quarter of the Old City to prepare young priests and Levites to perform the sacrificial rituals.  
The yeshiva’s curriculum focused on the much-neglected Talmudic tractate of Kodashim which 
laid out the painstaking details of the Temple service.  Inbari traces Kook’s influences back to 
rabbis like Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer, the Chaftez Chaim, and Chaim Hirschenson.  These thinkers 
all played a part in the new Jewish discourse that anticipated, subtly or overtly, retaking the 
Temple Mount and returning to ancient Judaism.
319
  Nevertheless, Kook refused to enter the 
Mount due to Mora Mikdash.  One day the world would recognize Jewish rights on the Mount—
only then could the Temple be rebuilt.
320
   
     Unable to claim the sacred rock, Jews turned to the Western Wall as Judaism’s next holiest 
site.  Rabbi Kook told the Shaw Commission that the Wall was “more sacred than all the 
Synagogues that exist throughout the world,” and was “the only place where every Jew can come 
and bare his soul for the destruction of the ancient glory of Israel.”  With respect to holiness, the 
Western Wall possessed the “same sanctity as that which pertains to the Holy Temple.”
321
  The 
dispute with the Arabs, Kook claimed, was an unfortunate turn of events not connected to a 
Jewish desire to take the Mount.
322
  He believed that the government should have forced an 
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exchange of the Western Wall for another waqf property and provided fair compensation to the 
Muslims who owned it.
323
  That the government had not done so showed a lack of resolve. 
     The Wailing Wall riots left “an almost complete social cleavage” between Jews and the 
British government.
324
  Mistrust of the British and their ability (or desire) to protect the Jewish 
community stimulated a strong turn toward self-determination.  A welcomed side-effect was the 
long-awaited reconciliation between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews.  In November 1928, Chaim 
Weizmann and Louis Marshall reached an agreement on the nonpartisan development of 
Palestine that was formalized at the next Zionist congress in late 1929.
325
  The main effect of the 
riots was a growing conviction among Jews that the Western Wall was a crucial part of national 
redemption.  One night shortly after the riots, Zionist leader Menachem Ussishkin traversed the 
dark alleys of Jerusalem to visit the Wall.  Ussishkin was one of many Jews who were not devout 
in observance of Jewish law but were strongly sentimental toward Jewish tradition.  For these 
Jews, possession of the Western Wall still represented the ultimate sign of Jewish redemption.   
Ussishkin’s narrative is rather moving: 
And so I stood before the Wall.  The sight surrounding this relic of our past always 
troubles my spirit.  This time my spirit was even more troubled inside me at the sight 
before my eyes.  The Wall, a reminder of our great and illustrious past, the lone relic of 
our Holy Place—there were only two Jews standing before it: the shammash and myself.  
The whole courtyard in front of the Wall was full of British policemen.  Above, beside 
the gate leading into the Mosque of Omar—the place of the Temple—Arabs stood gazing 
down upon the Jewish desolation.  I stood there silently in my sorrow and reminisced on 
days of old.  Two thousand years ago that entire courtyard was bustling with Jews from 
all over the land.  Upon the gate there was written in Latin and Greek a warning to 
foreigners forbidding them to approach the Temple.  So too the rulers of the world in 
those days, the Romans, were permitted to approach the gate but no farther.  Now once 
again the rulers of the world stand [there] but we, the people of Israel, are not permitted 
to go up to our Holy Place.  Instead we are treated as foreigners. 
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     As Ussishkin stood there lost in his thoughts, an old man entered the courtyard.  The man 
approached the Wall reverently and leaned his head solemnly against its massive stones.  The 
man was Rabbi Chaim Zonnefeld, the leader of Jerusalem’s ultra-Orthodox community.  
Zonnenfeld noticed Ussishkin and his troubled expression, and assured him that there was no 
need to despair. Ussishkin was encouraged by Zonnenfeld’s words: 
We will achieve our goals.  We won’t enter our Holy Place through narrow alleys with 
lowered heads, but like a king standing tall.  Keep working hard and maybe soon, in our 
days, we will succeed in seeing the real redemption.
326
   
 
     In the years that followed, the Western Wall became increasingly important for Jewish 
nationalism.  A young man named Moshe Segal visited the Wall courtyard to pray on Yom 
Kippur of 1930.  Segal had participated in the Jewish demonstration at the Wall just before the 
riots, and like many Zionists carried an equal blend of nationalism and religious sentiment.  He 
knew that the International Commission on the Wailing Wall had prohibited the blowing of the 
shofar, and he saw the policemen positioned all over the courtyard to prevent the act.  
“I…thought to myself: Can we possibly forgo the sounding of the shofar that accompanies our 
proclamation of the sovereignty of God? Can we possibly forgo the sounding of the shofar, 
which symbolizes the redemption of Israel?”  He found a shofar, blew the traditional blast, and 
was arrested immediately.
327
  For the next eighteen years, young Jewish men imitated Segal’s act 
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of courage by blowing the shofar at the Wall every Yom Kippur.  Although they were arrested 
each time, these young men did not regret “staking our claim on the holiest of our 
possessions.”
328
   
     Although they would not fully blossom until after 1967, trends were developing in Jewish 
religious thought that seemed to disregard the old principle of Mora Mikdash.  In May 1924, 
Rabbi Kook had visited a rabbinical assembly in America and proposed a revival of the old 
Sanhedrin, or Jewish supreme court.
329
  His proposal was rather radical considering that such a 
court had not existed for almost two millennia.  Yet this was not the first time that Kook had 
suggested reviving an ancient Jewish religious institution.  In 1922, a Christian newspaper in 
Britain had reported on the establishment of Kook’s Torat ha-Cohanim yeshiva.  The Zionist 
Executive—realizing the potentially explosive nature of the event—contacted Kook for an 
explanation.
330
  Kook’s response was bold:  
The foundation of the nation's renewal must be—despite all of its secular 
manifestations—based on its sanctified source. The inner desire of the nation is to be 
rooted once again in all matters of holiness. We must continually stress our eternal 
aspiration that the Temple be rebuilt speedily in our days—openly and with deep faith, 
without hesitation and misgivings…. [A]though this [yeshiva] is entirely and purely an 
institution for Torah study, its establishment nonetheless contains a hint to the world. The 
nations should not think that we have even a moment of despair, G-d forbid, of 
relinquishing our rights to the site of the Temple, the cornerstone of all holy places[.]
331
 
 
     Palestine’s Muslim community was also undergoing ideological transformation.  Not least 
significant was the emergence of a new brand of Islamic fundamentalism among Palestine’s 
peasant population.  In the early 1930s, a charismatic preacher named Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-
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Qassam captured their attention with his call for a return to “pure Islam” as the only way to cast 
off British and Jewish rule.
332
  Although the Supreme Muslim Council distanced itself from al-
Qassam, his fiery rhetoric influenced every corner of Palestine’s Arab community.  Edward 
Keith-Roach noted a growing militancy in certain sectors of Muslim society.  “In their war 
against Jews,” he noted, “they sincerely felt that they were waging a holy war and that their 
reward in heaven would be great.”
333
 
     Serious rifts split the Muslim community, however.  The Mufti’s subversive activities were 
far from universally supported by Palestine’s Muslims, and a significant faction led by the 
Nashashibi clan openly flouted his authority.  The battle lines were drawn between the 
Majlisiyyun, or supporters of the Mufti and his Supreme Muslim Council, and the Mu’aridun, or 
the Nashashibi opposition.
334
  The Majlisiyyun were prepared to do anything to remain in power, 
and recognized that holding the high ground inside the Haram guaranteed their position.  The 
Nashashibis were known as more moderate and had even made tentative gestures of peace 
toward the Jews.
335
  In December 1931, several prominent Muslim figures including the Emir of 
Transjordan, the Nawab of Bhopal, King Ali of the Hejaz, and Mustafa Pasha Nahas of Egypt 
met in Jerusalem for a pan-Islamic congress.  This congress was quickly divided by the rift 
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between the Palestinian factions.  When Haj Amin was elected president of the congress, his 
opposition openly declared their plans to dethrone him.
336
  
     This intra-Arab divide continued to grow throughout the early 1930s.  In May 1932, trustees 
of a Hebron waqf filed a petition in the secular courts against the Supreme Muslim Council 
alleging mismanagement of funds.  Although Court dismissed the claim as unfounded, it is worth 
nothing that these Hebronites were willing to sue the Supreme Muslim Council in secular 
court.
337
  In 1933, the Majlisiyyun and Mu’aridun physically clashed inside the Haram just 
before the Nebi Musa festival.
338
   On December 18, 1933, British High Commissioner Sir 
Arthur Wauchope wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies expressing concern over 
mounting tensions.  Palestine, he reported, was pervaded by a “general feeling of hostility.”  
More violence seemed inevitable.  “It is not the present, but the future, that chiefly concerns me,” 
Wauchope wrote, “and it is equally my duty to express my views on the future as on the present 
situation.”  He called for a restriction on Jewish immigration and stressed the need for 
representative government.
339
  “It does not seem possible to me that the present hostility and 
widening breach between the Arabs and the British rulers can remain as they are to-day; either 
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we find means to bring ruler and ruled more in sympathy, or the separation and hostility will 
grow deeper and more permanent each year.”
340
 
     Wauchope’s warning was prescient.  Three years later, the Arab revolt began.  This revolt 
started as a labor strike but degenerated into violence when its demands were not met.  Its main 
causes lay in Arab dissatisfaction with Zionism, the continued lack of parliamentary government, 
increased Jewish immigration, and ongoing Jewish land purchases.
341
  With the rise of Adolf 
Hitler in Germany, the number of Jewish settlers in Palestine had swollen to unprecedented 
numbers.  The Jewish community had quadrupled since 1922, and now comprised almost half 
the population of Palestine.
342
  It is not necessary to repeat the exhaustive details of the revolt 
here.  For our purposes, the most important aspect is the how the Haram ash-Sharif helped 
exacerbate the chaos. 
 
B. Refuge from the Law      
     The British response to the Arab revolt has been recognized as a textbook example of 
vacillation.
343
  Yet the British cannot take all the blame for the chaos that arose inside the Haram 
during the revolt.  To begin with, contemporary international law required that the British as an 
occupying power remain outside religious sites except in the most extreme conditions.  The 
Brussels Convention of 1874 prohibited military action against religious institutions.
344
  The 
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1880 Laws of War on Land, authoritative in British military circles, demanded the same.
345
  The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 did as well, but permitted incursion if the enemy was 
using the sites for military purposes.
346
 
     Beyond the strictly legal aspects, one must acknowledge the power of sacred spaces on their 
own right.  Roger Stump, who has done significant work on the subject, states that sacred spaces 
are significant because they lie at the intersection of the physical and the transcendent.
347
  That 
is, they demarcate areas where heaven and earth meet.  In such a space, mortal sovereigns stand 
powerless—only God rules there.  The effective result is a “divine jurisdiction” where secular 
power is excluded and religious communities are given authority and autonomy of action.  
Reasonable minds may differ on whether this de facto sovereignty derives from actual divine 
power, human superstition, or fear of offending public opinion.  But the fact is that throughout 
history kings and emperors have frequently shown deference and respect to holy places and their 
custodians.  
      If any place on earth had the power to constrain secular authority, it was the Temple Mount.  
The aura of inviolability that emanated from the site provided Muslims with an autonomy in 
which to conduct their internal affairs.  When the revolt began, this autonomy took on new 
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importance—the Haram provided a zone of lawlessness from which the Mufti and his supporters 
could direct their campaign of anarchy.
348
  British police withdrew from their posts near the site 
sometime between 1935 and 1936, recognizing growing hostility inside.
349
   Throughout much of 
1936, Wauchope urged Whitehall not to deport the Mufti for fear that a more radical leader 
would take his place and “raise the religious cry.”  However, by September 1936 Wauchope 
noted the strength of the opposition and believed the Mufti’s exile would allow moderate Arab 
leaders to take his place.
350
  Secretary of State for the Colonies Ormsby-Gore was reluctant to 
take such drastic action.  As a religious leader, the Mufti commanded the respect not only of 
Palestinian Muslims but of the Islamic world writ large.  Deporting him would likely lead to 
“serious repercussions” worldwide.
351
  No doubt the presence of a vast number of Muslims in 
Britain’s other dominions influenced Ormsby-Gore’s risk-benefit analysis.   
     The British tried to enforce law around the margins, but their efforts continually failed.  On 
October 1, 1936, they cut the phone lines to the Haram in an attempt to isolate the Mufti.  Two 
weeks later, they balked and restored service.
352
  The revolt strengthened as extremist groups 
began stirring the countryside to violence through the end of 1936 and into 1937.
353
  On July 17, 
1937, British police raided the offices of the Arab Higher Committee—an interreligious coalition 
of Arab clans united against Zionism—to arrest known agitators.  The Mufti, the Committee’s 
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leader, had already escaped into the Haram.
354
  The British Cabinet discussed their options in 
London.  Facing pressure from Arab leaders in Iraq and fearing the same religious cry dreaded 
by Wauchope, the Cabinet decided not to pursue the Mufti.  They recognized a basic inability to 
penetrate the sovereignty of the Haram: 
[I]t would not be practicable on political grounds to send Moslem police to effect the 
arrest of the Mufti within the Haram area; that Moslem police who could be trusted to 
carry out such a duty were not available; that considerable loss of life would be involved 
in an arrest by means of forced entry and that a military plan had been drawn up some 
months ago to surround the Haram area and to enter the Mufti's house, but that now that 
the Mufti was suspicious the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding 
considered that he would quickly escape into the Mosque of Aksa where it would be 
impossible to follow him.
355
 
 
     The Mufti continued to operate with impunity and dispatch hit squads from the Haram to 
eliminate his enemies.  Wauchope eventually ordered that the Mufti be arrested, and ordered 
police to guard the gates of the Haram to regulate access to the complex.  He was conscious of 
growing outrage among Palestine’s non-Muslim communities with the Mufti’s immunity from 
the law.  “The failure of Government to arrest the Mufti does not appear to have caused any loss 
of prestige,” Wauchope noted tentatively, “but I fear considerable criticism will be roused if time 
passes and Government is unable to take any steps against the Mufti.”
356
   
     Outrage was indeed beginning to grow among non-Muslims.
357
  A writer for the Palestine 
Post angrily condemned the government for allowing the Haram to become a sanctuary for 
terrorists.  “[W]hat is so devastating about these murders…is the terrorist’s assurance that he can 
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always make good his escape.”  Asylum from law was the central problem.  “When the head of 
the most populous religious community in this country, had reason several weeks ago to suspect 
that the law would no longer respect his person, he sought sanctuary on the outskirts of the 
Haram es Sharif, and the hand of the law recoiled from following its proposed course.”  
According to the Post, this abdication of government power sent a clear message.  “Terrorism 
made safe, and the safety of the terrorist, are the fruit of a policy of misapplied conciliation.  
Neither the doer of evil nor his harbourer, far less his inspirer, has been given reason to fear just 
retribution.”
358
 
     The British government recognized that a reign of terror was being orchestrated from the 
Haram, but remained powerless to stop it.  The Cabinet condemned the Mufti from London, 
called for his arrest, and outlawed the Arab Higher Committee.  But so long as he remained 
inside the Haram, the British were paralyzed.  The place remained a veritable fortress.
359
  When 
it was suggested in September 1937 that the Mufti be found and arrested, the British Secretary of 
State for India pleaded with his colleagues to respect the integrity of the Holy Places and to 
“think very seriously” before attempting to invade the Haram.
360
 
     Even British security around the borders of the complex was weak.  Sometime during the 
night of October 1, the Mufti slid down the wall of the Haram, slipped past guards in disguise, 
and escaped the country into Lebanon.  But the reign of terror inside the Haram had taken on a 
momentum of its own.  Haj Ismail Najjar, a wealthy supporter of the Nashashibi faction, was 
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shot and killed while walking inside the Haram on August 1, 1937.
361
   In November, Sheikh 
Mahmoud Jawdat Ansari was shot inside the Haram for the same reason.  On November 21, 
1937, William Battershill, acting as High Commissioner in Wauchope’s absence, wrote a private 
letter to John Shuckburgh of the Colonial Office describing his frustration at the persistent 
“Haram influence”:   
[M]ost of the villages surrounding Jerusalem are very much pro-Mufti and are 
definitely under the Haram influence. The village Sheikhs and Mukhtars have 
been accustomed to personal contact with Haj Amin or his minions, from whom 
they got their orders. And being under his influence more than other villagers 
they naturally are making more trouble than the villagers with whom the Mufti 
did not come into personal contact. A further reason is the fact that the Haram 
still contains a “cell” of organisers of disturbances. These organisers we 
cannot touch so long as they remain in the Haram.
362
 
 
     On July 12, 1938, Sheikh Ali Nur al-Khatib, an imam of al-Aqsa, was killed in the Muristan 
Quarter of the Old City.  He had been part of a minority group inside the Haram that disapproved 
of the Mufti’s methods and had refused to preach violence.
363
  A few days later, Sheikh Aref 
Yunis al-Husseini, chief curator of the Haram and a member of the Mufti’s own family, narrowly 
escaped an assassination attempt when hitmen hiding in a cemetery jumped out from behind a 
tombstone and sprayed his taxi with bullets.  This was a second attempt on the sheikh’s life, the 
first being only months prior.
364
 
    Continued frustration at their inability to stop the assassins based in the Haram led the British 
to take alternative measures.  In mid-March 1938, the government took the unprecedented step of 
opening a police post in the Haram and staffing it with a British corporal and four Arab 
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constables.
365
  Ten new gatekeepers were appointed over the entrances to the complex, and other 
personnel were replaced.
366
  Shortly thereafter, Chaim Weizmann wrote a letter to Balfour’s 
niece Blanche Dugdale remarking on the effectiveness of this new policy and how easy it was for 
the British to control the Haram when they had the will to do so: 
You remember that during your stay here Jerusalem was particularly bad.  Almost every 
day there was some murder perpetrated.  The reason being, that in the Haram area a band 
of regular assassins (including some particularly obnoxious negro) have taken sanctuary 
and from there conducted their murderous campaign.  [Colonial police advisor Charles 
Tegart] suggested to clear the Haram area and the pundits trembled at the mere mention 
of such an idea.  The Mosque is the second holy place of importance in Islam, the Islamic 
world will rise, etc. etc.  Telegrams galore were being dispatched to the Colonial Office 
and there an impression must have been produced that the world is tumbling over their 
ears.  At good last the area has been cleared, the holy assassins arrested, their papers 
confiscated and inter alia they have found vouchers, showing that the holy sheikhs were 
paying £.5.- a piece for every Jew assassinated…. They have dismissed all the Kadis in 
the villages who were merely the agents of the Mufti and on his payroll, they have 
cleared the Wakf administration which was a centre of bribery and corruption, and—what 
is most interesting—it has all passed off with the greatest possible quietness; nobody has 
said a word of protest or uttered a complaint; everybody, on the contrary, seems to be 
rather relieved as witnessed by the numberless applications from villages for the posts of 
the dismissed Kadis.
367
 
 
     It did not take long, however, before chaos returned to the Old City.  In late 1938, upon the 
advice of renowned colonial police officer Charles Tegart, the British government decided that 
force was the only way to restore order.  Just before dawn on October 19, 1938, soldiers 
executed a full military assault on the Old City.  The operation was unparalleled in its size.  “Not 
since that day in December 1917 when General Allenby marched at the head of his Forces into 
the Old City…was there such an entry of British troops as was seen early yesterday morning,” 
reported the Times.   As the British soldiers advanced, however, Muslim guerillas retreated into 
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the Haram.
368
  Soldiers could only cordon off the complex while airplanes dropped pamphlets 
over the city warning residents to stay inside their homes.   
     Muslim snipers inside the Haram soon began firing on the soldiers, but British commanders 
forbid them from shooting back.
369
  Two members of the Supreme Muslim Council secretly sent 
out a letter condemning the snipers, and offered to place guards at the entrances to the Haram’s 
minarets. “We do not object,” they wrote, “to the Government employing troops and putting 
them on houses overlooking the Haram area directly outside the Walls which the Government 
sees fit to occupy to preserve public security.”  The next day, in response to this show of good 
faith, British officers permitted thirty Muslims to enter for prayers.  They later opened the 
complex completely for Ramadan.
370
  
     Yet Jerusalem remained the scene of Arab gang warfare.  Said al-Khatib, a sheikh of al-Aqsa, 
was shot and killed on December 18, 1938.  He had been one of the two members of the Council 
who had condemned the snipers in the Haram.
371
  At his funeral, a sheikh from a nearby village 
accused the Mufti of ruthlessly assassinating more than two hundred of his opponents.
372
  On 
February 22 and March 4, respectively, Zuhdi and Adnan Nashashibi were killed in Husseini-
directed hits.
373
  In January, 1939, the Times came into possession of secret documents captured 
from Muslim assassins that described the lawless atmosphere inside the Haram.  The documents, 
belonging to a cousin of the Mufti, told of ad hoc court proceedings and summary executions led 
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by the Mufti’s enforcers.
374
  The Post claimed that these documents proved “how far removed 
this campaign is from anything resembling a national revolt.”
375
 
     The British realized the need for a British police officer to be stationed permanently inside the 
Haram by early 1939.  Muslims around the world were outraged.  The Official Wireless Press 
released a statement to calm their nerves, explaining that, “[T]he Haram esh Sharif differs from 
certain other structures in that it constitutes an extensive area honeycombed with hiding-places 
of which malefactors sometimes take advantage.”  For the maintenance of order, it was 
imperative for the government to maintain a presence there.  The statement assured Muslims that 
the British police officer and his Arab subordinates would work from a small room in the Haram 
and respect the sanctity of the place.
376
  The Press Office released a second reassurance a few 
weeks later.
377
   
     The revolt continued until September 1939 and was only suppressed by severe military 
force.
378
  With World War II on the horizon, the British had no desire to be mired in Palestine.
379
  
One supposes that the assertion of a British police presence inside the Haram also had something 
to do with the end of violence.  In the end, the three-year revolt claimed approximately 5,000 
lives and forever doomed the chance of a unified Palestine.  The British proposal for partitioning 
the country between Jews and Arabs, put forward by the Peel Commission of 1937, marked a 
major shift in British policy.  The subsequent proposal in 1939 for a unified, independent state of 
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Palestine—governed by Jews and Arabs in proportion to their populations—marked an even 
bigger shift.  However, it would be another decade before the British would finally retreat from 
Palestine and leave it to Jews and Arabs to sort out peace for themselves.   
     Muslim authority inside the Haram continued during World War II, albeit in far more muted 
tones after the crushing of the Arab revolt.  Kupferschmidt argues that after the Mufti escaped 
from Palestine, the Supreme Muslim Council settled down to do the job it had originally been 
created to do: quietly manage Islamic affairs in Palestine.
380
  However, violence in and around 
the Haram continued during the war and afterward.  In 1947, two Jewish refugees were 
sightseeing during Passover.  Not comprehending the danger, twenty-five year old Asher 
Itzkowitz and thirty-six year old Itzhak Itzkowitz visited the Western Wall on a Friday.  The two 
inadvertently walked into the Haram where they were immediately attacked by an Arab mob.  
Asher was killed in the melee. Itzhak survived, but only because an Arab policeman dragged him 
into the Dome of the Rock and slammed the gate closed.  Ironically, Asher had survived 
Auschwitz only to be killed in Jerusalem.
381
  Around the same time, the Jewish Agency accused 
Muslims of hiding thirty tons of explosives in the Haram.
382
  Muslim leaders denied the 
accusation.
383
   
     Jewish assertions of authority over the Western Wall also continued.  News of Hitler’s 
genocide became more real with the arrival of each new refugee from Nazi Europe.  It was clear 
that the Jews needed a state of their own now more than ever, and that the British were the main 
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obstacle in their way. Young men continued to smuggle shofars into the Western Wall courtyard 
and blow them in defiance of the British.  Blowing the shofar became an expression of Jewish 
sovereignty in Palestine.
384
  In 1942, approximately 50,000 Jews from around the country came 
to the Western Wall to lament the destruction of the Temple.  Male and female soldiers joined in 
singing the Zionist national anthem.
385
  Toward the end of the war, even Jewish Communists 
were gathering at the Wall to pray for the victory of Stalin and the Red Army.
386
   
     Assertions of Jewish authority in Palestine became more violent.  One Jewish sniper shot an 
Arab gang-leader through the head as he was walking inside the Haram.
387
   In 1940—not long 
after the British published their famous White Paper of 1939 restricting Jewish immigration and 
land purchases—a paramilitary group called Lehi or the “Stern Gang” split from another Jewish 
military force with the goal of casting off British rule and establishing a Jewish state by any 
means necessary.  Although numbering only a few hundred men, the Stern Gang succeeded in 
assassinating several high profile figures and sending shockwaves through the country.
388
  
Avraham Stern, the founder of the group, laid out his “18 Principles of Rebirth” that included 
Jewish sovereignty, redemption of the land, and a population transfer of Arabs.  The eighteenth 
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principle called for rebuilding the Third Temple as a fulfillment of national rebirth.  This 
proposal was not based on a desire to reinstitute ancient Judaism, but on an awareness of the 
power of Hebrew history and culture.
389
 
     Of course, neither the Stern Gang nor anyone else succeeded in rebuilding the Jewish temple.  
With the outbreak of war in 1948, the Jews found themselves completely excluded from both the 
Temple Mount and the Western Wall.  King Hussein of Jordan captured Jerusalem and the West 
Bank after making a deal made with the Israelis, but proceeded to bar Jewish entry to the site for 
the next two decades.  Hussein’s policy stood in contravention to the recommendations of the 
Anglo-American Commission of 1946 and the United Nations’ decision to partition Palestine 
and make Jerusalem an enclave under the UN Trusteeship Council.
390
  For Jews, Hussein’s 
behavior brought back memories of Titus and Hadrian.
391
  Their abrupt separation from the 
Western Wall left a deep psychological scar whose ramifications only became known after 
Israel’s capture of Jerusalem in 1967.
392
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VI. CONCLUSION 
     The arrival of the British in 1917 shocked the communities living in Palestine.  Donna 
Robinson Divine notes the particularly disorienting effect it had on the Arab Muslim community.  
This disorientation stemmed from a single difficult question: What did Muslim society look like 
under non-Muslim rule?     
Political life in Muslim societies must be conceived as not only serving immediate 
economic and political needs but also as demonstrating how an authentic Muslim life 
could be imagined and lived. Once the Ottoman Empire was destroyed in World War I 
and its parts severally divided among European mandatory powers, Palestinian [Arab] 
men and women found themselves in such a dramatically changed political environment 
that they could not easily or quickly understand which material ingredient in British rule 
might be used as the basis from which to construct their own independent community.
393
  
 
     I would argue that the material ingredient for Muslim independence in Palestine was the 
autonomous space inside the Haram ash-Sharif.  In the Haram, Arab Muslims could hide from 
the power of law and foster their resistance to British governance.  The Mandate’s policy of 
affirmative deference and complete Muslim sovereignty over the site created an ideal sanctuary 
for indigenous authority.  Throughout the Mandate Arabs vigorously defended the autonomy of 
the site against foreign encroachment as they had for almost a century, only now with a far 
greater sense of urgency and fervor.   
     Palestine’s Jews harbored their own hopes for the Temple Mount.  While prepared to accept 
Muslim sovereignty on the Temple platform, Jews planned to build a synagogue in the Western 
Wall courtyard and make it the cornerstone of the Jewish national home.  The Temple Mount-
centered theology that would emerge after 1967 was not yet fully formed, but some Jews even 
anticipated the reconstruction of the Temple and the resumption of sacrifices in the near future.  
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What is clear is that both secular and religious Zionists saw possession of the Western Wall as 
fundamental to the success of their program.  For this reason, attempts by Arabs to exclude them 
prompted a counter-reaction for affirmative expression of Jewish authority at the site.   
     Managing this divine jurisdiction presented innumerable difficulties for the British.  They 
believed that they had neither religious nor cultural legitimacy to make change at the site, and 
passed their legal authority on to an international commission that never materialized.  In the 
interim, they withdrew the Temple Mount from civil jurisdiction and assigned decision-making 
to executive officers.  This effective non-policy—defined through the status quo—together with 
a formal grant of Muslim sovereignty allowed the continuance of organic authority in the center 
of Palestine that helped destabilize the regime and stimulate Jewish rebellion.   
     Current historiography of the Mandate pays virtually no attention to this unique dynamic at 
the center of the Jewish-Arab conflict.  This paper fills this gap by drawing attention to the legal, 
social, and spatial contours of the Temple Mount, and taking a fresh look at the period through 
the lens of sacred space.  The ability of such spaces to undermine secular governance has not 
been studied sufficiently, and this paper hopes to provide a useful case study for later analysis.  
Substantively, future research could focus on contemporary Arabic sources and the influence, or 
lack thereof, of Islamic law on the activity of the Muslim community in Palestine.  Conceptually, 
future research should seek to integrate this case into a larger theoretical framework that explains 
how secular governments have historically confronted sacred space and how their various 
approaches have succeeded or failed. 
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